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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## CONTENTS

## THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- International Cooperation Marks Leopard 2 Tank  
(Michael Inama von Sternegg, Bernd Bruns; SOLDAT UND  
TECHNIK, Oct 80) ..... 1

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Bundeswehr's Contribution to Forward Defense  
(Hans-Joachim Mack; WEHRTECHNIK, Oct 80) ..... 5

## COUNTRY SECTION

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- German Terrorists Suspected of Planning Bacteriological Warfare  
(Jean-Paul Picaper; LE FIGARO, 8-9 Nov 80) ..... 8

## BELGIUM

- Minister Galle Interviewed on Flemish Affairs  
(Marc Galle Interview; KNACK, 22 Nov 80) ..... 10

- Martens Interviewed on Possible Social, Economic Reforms  
(Wilfried Martens Interview; KNACK, 29 Oct 80) ..... 16

## FINLAND

- Paper's Editor Comments on Kekkonen's Visit to Moscow  
(Editorial, Jan-Magnus Jansson; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET,  
12 Nov 80) ..... 22

## FRANCE

- Naval Weapons Exports Increasing  
(Jean-Gabriel Predet; LE MATIN, 4 Nov 80) ..... 25

Present, Future Balance Between Labor Unions, Politics (Jean Dubois; PROJET, Nov 80) .....	32
---	----

#### SPAIN

Canary Communist Party's Ayala on Autonomy, Military Bases (Aurelio Ayala Interview; TRIBUNA POPULAR, 31 Oct- 6 Nov 80) .....	38
---	----

#### TURKEY

Ecevit Resigns From RPP Leadership (CUMHURİYET, 31 Oct 80) .....	41
Saltik Announces Transitional Program (Haydar Saltik; MILLİYET, 2 Nov 80) .....	43
Personal Property Statements To Be Required (Saygi Öztürk; HURRIYET, 1 Nov 80) .....	51



## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MARKS LEOPARD 2 TANK

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Oct 80 pp 558-559

[Article by Col Michael Inama von Sternegg and Production Director Bernd Bruns: "The Leopard 2 Tank in the Framework of International Cooperation"]

[Text] By definition international cooperation is feasible only with two or more — hopefully compatible — partners for the ultimate purpose of cheaper joint armaments projects. There is usually little mention of the advantages, achieved commonalities and increases in national trade but there is always the tendency to discuss problems and failures. Tank developments, particularly the series of German tanks, are hardly comprehensible without the background of the repeated attempts at international cooperation.

It should be noted in retrospect that the Leopard 1 tank also originated in bilateral cooperation, namely the German-French standard tank. The political possibilities of cooperation with the Republic of France arose almost simultaneously with the origin of the description of desired performance, then still called "military requirement," for the first native tank development of the newly established Bundeswehr [federal armed forces]. Different and completely national prototypes were built on the basis of a coordinated requirement and a comparative test in equipment and user terms was to result in a "standard tank." The procurement programs ran asunder not least because of the German decision to use a British gun development and the French preference for their gun with only one type of armor-defeating ammunition. After the termination of the bilateral program, the French adopted the AMX 30 and the Federal Republic of Germany the Leopard 1.

There is an obvious parallel with the Leopard 2 tank. It is also the offspring of an initially bilateral program, being the German descendant of the German-American Battle Tank 70 program.

#### German-American Battle Tank 70 Program

In 1963 prototypes of this tank were developed on the basis of jointly produced military requirements. The goal was joint introduction of a tank. In early 1970 — the year of planned introduction which gave the project its name — the commonality was ended and both countries agreed to go their separate ways. From the Battle Tank 70 the United States developed the XM 803, a project which had to

be abandoned shortly thereafter due to excessive costs. But the General Motors version of the XM 1 originated from this. It proved, however, inferior to the Chrysler XM 1 in the national trials. This tank, now called the Abrams, will be delivered in considerable numbers to the U.S. Army beginning this year.

At the beginning of the 1970's Germany switched to the Leopard 2K (K for gun [Kanone]) in contrast to the 152mm combination weapon provided as the only armament on the Battle Tank 70. The basis for this development began during the Battle Tank 70 period as a so-called experimental study based on performance improvement of components such as fire control and powerplant capable of being integrated in the Leopard 1. An important benefit for Leopard 2 from the Battle Tank 70 was the powerplant consisting of an MTU engine and Renk transmission with ring cooling, the development of which was essentially complete. It can still be considered a technological peak today. Both nations still profit in the development areas of management/cost control, night vision technology and protection, important principles and ideas of which were initiated in the Battle Tank 70.

#### The German-British Battle Tank 3 Project

This project was based on a comparison of the NATO "replacement schedule" in 1969. This comparison indicated that both countries planned the introduction of a new tank from 1986 on. The idea in the Federal Republic of Germany at the time was to replace the Leopard 1 in this year. It need only be indicated here, without going into the program in detail, that adoption of the knowledge of a new tank technology from the Battle Tank 3 program gave the Leopard 2 a significant improvement of its armor protection and thus of its combat value. However, a weight increase was associated with complete exploitation of the MLC 60 as compared with the MLC 50.

#### Coordination of Leopard 2 and XM 1

After a governmental agreement was concluded in December 1974, the U.S. Army and the Federal Ministry of Defense agreed to make, within the framework of national requirements for the next tank generation, all acceptable efforts to achieve the highest possible degree of standardization in the introduction of the XM 1 and Leopard 2 tanks in the armed forces of both countries. The United States also declared its intent to make comparative trials of a Leopard 2 built to U.S. Army specifications in accordance with the valid rules and limitations applicable to the XM 1.

A new prototype, the PT 19, was built specifically for this test. The main features of this tank were the previously mentioned considerably improved armor protection and, in contrast to the German Leopard 2 version, a 105mm rifled gun instead of the 120mm smoothbore. This was logical from the standpoint of guaranteeing direct comparability of weapon, ammunition and fire performance.

The performance of the Leopard 2 tank was convincingly demonstrated during the comparative trial which took place in September through December 1976 under total American responsibility with American crews.

The American Congress agreed with the U.S. Army proposal of developing the Chrysler version of the XM 1 to series production readiness. Since a joint tank did not result, agreement was sought with the United States as early as July 1976 on the possibility of harmonizing the tanks in at least the components areas and thus largely satisfying national needs. Agreement was reached to standardize those components particularly important to interoperability. This meant either making them identical and producing them in each country or agreeing on connecting dimensions to guarantee mutual use of components. The factual basis was the circumstance that turret and hull could definitely be different and, not being subject to normal wear and tear, not relevant in the logistics sense. Thus domestic military and economic needs could be completely satisfied. It was a different story for the servicing of important components and consumables such as ammunition and fuel. Thus the supplementary agreement already mentioned called for efforts to achieve commonality in the following areas:

- weapon and ammunition,
- powerplant,
- tracks and associated components,
- fire control,
- fuel.

The ammunition and powerplant were obviously the core of the new agreement. The newest technologies were emphasized in both main components. Fortunately the United States has agreed to adopt the German 120mm smoothbore weapon. Series installation in the XM 1, however, will begin at a later point since the necessary integration could not be accomplished at the beginning of the series.

The American side took the unconventional step of selecting a turbine engine for the XM 1 powerplant. The advantages of this technology are the higher starting torque and some savings in weight as compared with a conventional piston engine of equal performance; however, the higher fuel consumption is also an obvious disadvantage. This requires a larger fuel tank volume for the same radius of action. The design volume saved with this engine is thus cancelled by this disadvantage.

It was primarily the high fuel consumption which made acceptance of this powerplant for the Leopard 2 appear not acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany. A detailed design study and installation of a gas turbine engine in a prototype, however, proved the theoretical possibility of installation in the Leopard 2 with the penalty of considerable rebuilding of the chassis.

As compared with both of the components named, harmonization in other areas was forced somewhat into the background but did not become less important as a result. The Federal Republic of Germany had already decided to adopt an American (Hughes) fire control system before the governmental agreement was concluded. This applied equally to the thermal image device developed in the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of adoption of so-called common modules for such devices. The intended installation of the Leopard 2 120mm smoothbore weapon in the XM 1 made it necessary to freeze cross-sectional dimensions since the United States plans to produce the weapon.



## Leopard 2 in the Netherlands

In 1979 the Netherlands became the first NATO partner to decide to introduce Leopard 2, 445 tanks, in its armed forces. The Federal Republic of Germany is very much aware of the political value of this decision. Acceptance by the Netherlands was also facilitated by a high degree of compensation from German industry.

## Joint Modification Service

This purchase of the complete Leopard 2 weapon system by the Dutch army likewise involves a joint logistics process and also a modification service based on national procedures. The principles are a procedure in accordance with VG 95031, purchase, license and cooperation agreements and national peculiarities in the weapon system. These include the recoil mechanism and ammunition as well as fitting to XM 1 features in the case of the United States and domestic radio equipment, machinegun, driver night vision and intercom in the case of the Netherlands.

The important points of the appropriate agreements are the naming of the German producer as being responsible for blueprint management, the necessity for commonality in accomplishing modifications, a division of costs based on the number of participating countries rather than on the number of weapon systems and a clause on terminating cooperation. Overall control, which also takes account of national needs in regard to different configurations, is based on Leopard 1 weapon system logistical servicing experience.

## Leopard 2 in Switzerland

Swiss interest as a non-NATO country presents a totally new aspect in the management of the Leopard 2 weapon system. Since Switzerland stopped its domestic development last year, the Leopard 2 has a good chance against its most important competitor, the XM 1 tank from the United States.

## Prospects

After many attempts with different promising prerequisites, it can be said in summary that tank cooperation belongs to the most difficult undertakings in the armaments area. There is general agreement that the tank as the main weapon system of the army has a great deal of prestige in all countries but, on the other hand, the economic policy background also plays a decisive role. The structure of the tank building industry in particular is not configured like that of the aircraft industry, for example, and thus a demarcation line cannot be drawn on the turret circular track. At present, however, it is clear that an important prerequisite for a positive cooperation consists of successfully dividing labor packages so that units are formed in development and procurement which have technically logical limits and "equal value" and take account of national economic features of the tank building industries.

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## BUNDESWEHR'S CONTRIBUTION TO FORWARD DEFENSE

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 80 pp 15-16

[Article by Maj Gen Hans-Joachim Mack, chief of staff in the Army Headquarters of the Federal Ministry of Defense: "The Contribution of the Army to Forward Defense — Cooperation of NATO Ground and Air Forces"]

[Text] Defense policy developments of recent years have given rise to a lively discussion on North Atlantic defense alliance strategic questions. This discussion has assumed particularly important proportions in the Federal Republic of Germany because the Bundeswehr [federal armed forces] faces difficult decisions about the development and introduction of new weapon systems for the 1990's. The totally public debate on principles frequently reflected misunderstandings, particularly about the role of the German armed forces within the alliance and about the division of missions among the services for the purpose of common defense. In the following article Major General Hans-Joachim Mack, chief of staff in the Army Headquarters of the BMVg [Federal Ministry of Defense] outlines the contribution of the German Army to forward defense in cooperation with NATO ground and air forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The NATO concept of unlimited forward defense as an important element of deterrence forms the basis of army planning. But forward defense is not just indispensable as a political prerequisite for the German defense contribution. It is also dictated militarily because of the shallow depth of the operations areas. Yielding one's own territory and populace with the goal of wearing out the enemy and then making a stubborn defense in depth is not an operationally expedient defense concept nor is it a strategic concept suitable for deterrence and preventing war.

The goal of forward defense is striking the conventional attack formations of an aggressor on a timely basis at the beginning of an attack when they are particularly vulnerable and before their attack has gathered momentum. This means that NATO forces have to undertake a complete defense of the areas near the border and win back the initiative in order that the war can be ended as quickly as possible and with the lowest possible losses and destruction.

## High Standing Requirements

The operational missions present a threat requiring that NATO ground forces be organized as large mechanized formations and be so equipped that the contingents of all alliance partners can conduct a coherent defense shoulder-to-shoulder. The high standing requirement guarantees that defense can be undertaken on a timely basis and close to the border as described.

The concept of an area defense, recently introduced in the discussion as an alternative for the army, presents a contrast to forward defense. These ideas cannot be harmonized with security policy goals and military missions nor do they respond to the threat of an opponent with modern weapons. They would also exceed the personnel and financial bounds of the Bundeswehr.

The army is instead concentrating its efforts on achieving the fourth army structure. This will make it capable of largely satisfying NATO armed forces requirements and of accomplishing its operational missions more effectively than hitherto.

Within the framework of forward defense the German Army has to occupy the largest part of the common front at the beginning of armed conflict. The threat assessment requires standing, quickly available large formations which have, in peacetime, a location favorable to their operational areas. The peacetime stationing of the individual national contingents of the alliance determines their employment within the framework of operational command. In accordance with this, an allocation of missions and assignment of the large formations to the forward deployed main defense forces or to the operational reserves has developed within the NATO ground forces.

The German field army, having a large share of the standing forces stationed in the country, assumes, with the beginning of the attack, the main burden of responsibility for a successful forward defense on the soil of the Federal Republic of Germany. This mission can, of course, be accomplished only in cooperation with the air forces.

## Rapidly Establish Main Defense Areas

In the critical initial phase of an aggression, it is imperative that surprise attack concentrations be countered with rapid defense concentrations. The role of the air forces in defense operations is determined by their capability of rapid reaction and concentrating firepower over great distances. The air forces can substantially relieve the ground forces by separating attack spearheads from following formations and by combatting these approaching forces. In addition to battlefield interdiction, close air support can exert strong direct influence on the course of battle. The best possible use of all forces and equipment will be decided in accordance with the estimate of the situation and the possibilities of joint operational command.

We should, for this reason, avoid establishing the missions in detail at the present time. It seems particularly dangerous to me that unrealistic assumptions are made. This includes, for example, the assumption that the ground forces will not be able to deploy on a timely basis and thus the armored spearhead of the enemy will have to — and can be — stopped from the air. The army has created the prerequisites allowing strong combat formations to be deployed against the enemy even given a very short preparation time. Intercepting armored spearheads with combat aircraft is very difficult and, given integrated air defense equipment in the spearhead, will result in heavy losses even if other factors such as appropriate armament or all-weather capability apply. The more important point is to act jointly in the initial phase. Joint action inevitably leads to supporting combat troops on the battlefield both by ground forces combat support troops and by air defense and air attack forces. In the final analysis forward defense is holding one's own territory by deploying combat troops in positions in the field.

#### **Air Forces Support Measures**

As combat actions progress, all measures continue to be aimed at making combat troops capable of holding the defense areas. The support measures for successful continuation of ground forces forward defense require that the air forces:

- provide the ground forces timely, important foundations for planning on operational command levels by reconnaissance;
- provide the large formations freedom of movement by neutralizing enemy air forces in at least concentration areas. This makes an important contribution to territorial forces being able to maintain operational freedom in the rear areas;
- prevent the enemy from employing his superior forces at the front according to plan by attacks against his approaching echelons. The success of the main defense forces depends to a large degree on whether the air forces can weaken the second echelons of the attack armies and achieve a lasting delay of their coming into action in the combat command;
- also attacks against the command centers of the enemy can strongly influence his operational command and thus considerably disturb the course of operations.

There has been a good deal of discussion recently as to whether these air forces missions should still be called "support" of the ground forces or whether this is a case of independent missions or measures of a separate air warfare. The degree of mutual coordination is used to differentiate.

From the army viewpoint the term "air support" is in no way degrading. In the tactical area combat support troops provide an indispensable contribution to "combined arms combat" equal in value to that of the combat troops. In the operational and strategic areas this should equally apply to the cooperation of the services.

#### **Combined Services Combat**

There cannot be an independent land or air warfare. Every military measure, regardless of the service involved, must be directed at the common goal and coordinated in the command staffs with the measures of the other services.

Only in "combined arms combat" can the special capabilities of the ground and air forces be employed in a manner appropriate to the situation and to the greatest possible use for overall warfare.

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## GERMAN TERRORISTS SUSPECTED OF PLANNING BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 8-9 Nov 80 p 7

[Article by Jean-Paul Picard: "Terrorism-- The Bacteriological Weapon"]

[Text] Are German terrorists preparing bacteriological warfare against society? This plan, which can only be generated in unbalanced minds, is advanced by NOUVELLE REVUE ILLUSTRÉE. NEUE REVUE ILLUSTRIERTE, which is printed in Hamburg, in the issue to be distributed Monday on newsstands, makes reference to "absolutely reliable sources" in support of its revelations.

In essence, the revelation consists of the following: German and French police raided an apartment on the sixth floor of 41A Chaillot Street in Paris, which was rented by terrorists, and discovered a miniature laboratory intended for the culture of bacterium whose action leads to death within a week by paralyzing the respiratory tract of contaminated individuals.

The two-room apartment on Chaillot Street had been rented in May by a young Belgian who claimed to be called Jan Dekerk and who paid the rent in advance for a period of 3 months. Since the tenant gave no further sign of life, his landlady reported this matter to the police around mid October.

It appears that the French police discovered a miniature laboratory with a culture medium of the "clostridium botulinum" bacterium. The medical profession would be practically powerless to cope with this type of germ whose effect is deadly. The apartment also contained typed sheets referring to bacterial pathology. Handwritten notes on the margins of these sheets were identified by graphologists of the German police force as being the handwriting of Silke Maier-Witt. Other items discovered included medical publications dealing with the struggle against bacterial infection, printing presses, forged documents, rubber stamps and passports, as well as a file cabinet full of instructions for manufacturing bombs. A detonator for an extremely complex model was discovered at the site.

Silke Maier-Witt, 30 years of age, is a medical assistant. She therefore possessed knowledge which is indispensable for the "manufacture of microbes." Certainly, this cannot be a laboratory for amateurs since the culture medium was placed in a special anaerobic retort, sheltered from the presence of oxygen. Mrs Maier-Witt may not be the only individual involved in this case.



After the automobile accident which took the lives of two terrorists near Stuttgart on last 25 July, the German police searched the damaged car and found clues leading to Mrs Maier-Witt and Dr Ekkahard von Seckendorf-Gudent. This Hamburg physician, who joined the forces of terrorism in 1977, settled in Paris during 1978. His apartment, rented in the name of Bernd Chedad (the same individual who claimed to be a student at the Sorbonne) served as a hideout for terrorists. Seckendorf-Gudent disappeared last June. Both he and Mrs Maier-Witt are now on the most-wanted list of the Baader gang, together with Adelheid Schulz, Christian Klar and Inge Viett. A reward of 50,000 marks has been offered to anyone furnishing information leading to their arrest; 550,000 leaflets bearing their descriptions have been distributed in Germany and eastern France.

French and German authorities refuse to take any position on this matter and continue to pass the buck.

[At police headquarters in Paris, it was confirmed that, on 14 October, a police squad had entered the apartment at 41A Chaillot Street upon the request of a tenant who, after a stay abroad, did not find the Belgian student to whom he had sublet his apartment during his absence. The student had given his name as Jan Dekerk. He was rapidly identified to be none other than Ralf Baptiste Fridrich, a German terrorist who was wanted by the police. Before disappearing, he had left a suitcase and five cartons in the apartment. In the suitcase, police found documents and equipment for forging documents. The French police immediately alerted their German colleagues. The latter, who employed a rogatory commission, took possession of the suitcase and cartons that the French police had seized, without however taking a complete inventory. Therefore, the police refuse to confirm or deny the reports emanating from Germany.]

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## MINISTER GALLE INTERVIEWED ON FLEMISH AFFAIRS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 22 Nov 80 pp 49-52

[Interview with Marc Galle, minister of Flemish community affairs, by Jos Grobbens: "Marc Galle and the Good Hunters"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] One of the departments in the Martens III administration where, in relative quiet, during the last few months -- in fact, the last year and a half -- a great deal of work was done on a thousand and one projects, is that of Marc Galle, minister of Flemish community affairs. Water purification, environment, forests, hunting, fishing, intercommunal boards, municipalities, business support, all of this was pushed on to a new ministry, which was put under the management of the former language purist. While Wilfried Martens and his colleagues were worrying about the problem of the intercommunal boards -- an item which had been handed to them by the very same Galle --, we had an interview with the boss of this ministry which, in the first instance, seemed to be burdened only with a multiplicity of jurisdictions.

[Marc Galle] At first -- partly also because of the small number of personnel -- this was considered a certain handicap, but we quickly learned that a number of those jurisdictions bordered on each other, that in a sense the various matters belonged together. I am, for example, guardian of the Flemish cities and municipalities, a legacy from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but at the same time subsidized works fall under my jurisdiction, which used to be under the minister of public works. Those two ministers used to operate completely apart from each other; the one did not know what the other did; with the new distribution of jurisdictions, this has changed. In addition, there is the water, which is also a municipal matter and which used to be allocated to the Ministry of Public Health. Thus, there is a certain coherence; the jurisdictions and matters fit closely together.

With regard to environmental problems, over which I also have authority, it is often also the municipalities which are in the center of things, because they are the first two to be confronted by them. It is only Public Initiative and Planning which in terms of content is somewhat detached from the other jurisdictions.

[Question] Things must be rather difficult with this latter jurisdiction, if for no other reason than the latent lack of funds.

[Galle] We should not put our money in insurable enterprises. That is idiotic. The funds which are available to us could best be used for companies whose productivity can be proven, where jobs can be saved or where units can be made profitable. And we must be honest enough in this process to admit that there could also be non-profitable units and that we will just have to handle the unfortunate consequences in terms of jobs. We have proven, after all, that there are companies which can be saved. Junatt, for example, Cerac and Claeys. The fact is that the Flanders has a reputation for building good bicycles; why not try to uphold that reputation then? At the present time, we are examining all possible formulas for Gregg.

[Question] What criteria do you use then in the selection of companies to be supported?

[Galle] We look at the productivity and check whether there is any technology in the company which is specifically its own.

A Red Minister

[Question] The policy concerning support to enterprises which are experiencing difficulties seems anything but transparent. In the Flanders alone, it involves two ministers and a secretary of state.

[Galle] However, the jurisdictions among those three are very well defined. Look, you have an enterprise in difficulty, and if this remains so, then we take a position together. Or it goes into bankruptcy and then it is obviously no longer a company in difficulty. In such a situation, we will try to build a new company, as in the case of Gregg now. Perhaps we will be able to manage things there now with a smaller number of employed workers, at least for a new beginning.

The protocol for these matters is also rather simple. When a company gets into difficulties, Andre Kempinaire studies the file. Next, Paul Akkermans checks whether the expansion legislation can be applied and as soon as the government is involved, the whole affair ends up here. Then we can instruct the Regional Investment Company for the Flanders to develop a productivity study, to check which would be the most appropriate formula, and to estimate the costs of a rescue operation.

[Question] Doesn't this remain a rather cumbersome and often time-consuming procedure?

[Galle] We want to simplify that, among other things by placing somebody who represents the relevant departments directly in the Investment Company. The cumbersome links, the sending on from one minister to another, to the department of enterprises in difficulty, would thus be avoided.

[Question] The intercommunal boards also fall within your jurisdiction. Your first attempt to break up a private sector monopoly here, failed...

[Galle] No, no, we won that Interger case. We knew beforehand -- considering the composition of the relevant boards of aldermen and earlier decisions -- that the odds of obtaining a pure formula were extremely small. However, /that/ [in italics] was not the only thing we were interested in. One of our goals was that, in the future, the municipalities would no longer be allowed to make a decision based on a single file. And, via the Flemish executive, we have ensured that henceforth the

municipalities will /have to/ [in italics] compare various options with each other, that various formulas -- including the pure one, then -- have to be looked at. And as far as Interger specifically is concerned, we did obtain the adjustment of the statutes. The stipulated period of time was shortened, the municipalities got a greater voice, and the modalities for withdrawal were adjusted. Previously, these things were simply not talked about.

[Question] But you can hardly speak of victory, can you? The boards of aldermen themselves refused to follow you.

[Galle] That is true, but they had already made their decision at that time. It is apparently still very difficult to reverse a decision. However, I maintain that we have won, in the sense that we have loosened something. Diksmuide, for example, -- which concerned an intercommunal board completely different from Interger -- recently opted for a pure formula and I believe that this would /not/ [in italics] have happened without that previous history. The current negotiations concerning mixed intercommunal boards are also related to this.

[Question] It was clear from the dossier that the Ministry of Flemish Community Affairs harbored a socialist minister. Is this then the only, really substantial political dossier you have handled?

[Galle] I acted more as defender of the common interest than as a socialist. Such dividends of 6 percent for the municipalities are immoral, aren't they? So much for that, but it really was not the only politically loaded dossier. The planning idea -- and that is also socialist, after all -- can be found in that matter of the intercommunal boards, but also in the circulars which I have sent to the municipalities, and in the policy concerning Public Initiative, although it is very difficult to establish a line in this. We must salvage what can be salvaged. This is a motto which I would like to hang in this department one day.

[Question] Outwardly, you do not behave as a socialist either. You demonstrate that redness less than, for example, someone like Tobback, Calewaert or even Claes.

[Galle] I simply act the way I am. Those three individuals may manifest themselves with more outspokenness, but each time they do that within the framework of their jurisdictions. Tobback as parliamentary party leader, Calewaert as minister of national education and Claes -- well, he is simply our spokesman within the government. Everyone expects him to play that role. As a matter of fact, something like that is not expected of me. And yet, I have often read in the press that the red Galle is fighting with someone like Secretary of State Akkermans.

#### Good Hunters

[Question] A few months ago, you appointed a Flemish Higher Hunting Board. Isn't it strange then that you put aside the very first piece of advice to come out of it -- namely, to have an open season on snipes?

[Galle] The Hunting Board gave me rather extensive advice. I accepted several of their suggestions, but not the one concerning an open season on woodcocks and forest snipes. Last season, I had already prohibited the hunting of woodcocks, and I did not want to reverse my decision. This prohibition will remain because it concerns a bird here of which there is no surplus population, which does not damage crops



and which, according to our information, is decreasing in numbers in Europe. This is why I went against this particular advice. In the final analysis, this Hunting Board is and remains nothing more than an /advisory/ [in italics] body and I, as minister, can conduct my own policy. I am only responsible to the parliament.

[Question] How do you explain those unusually strong reactions to your decision in hunting circles then?

[Galle] I know that the /good hunters/ [in italics] are behind us; I even know that there are hunters on the Hunting Board who share my opinion, but who do not dare to acknowledge it openly. Game, that belongs to the community. Why shouldn't that community then, through the mouth of an elected minister, create some order in the management of that game, in the hunting? After all, what purpose does hunting serve? To prevent overpopulation and to limit crop damage. In my opinion, hunting should not develop into a decadent pleasure.

In the Departement du Nord, in France, partridge hunting is prohibited. Nobody has objected to that, not even the hunters, because such a decision is considered to be very normal there. It is different here. Hunters were used to doing whatever they wanted to and when one day a minister with ethical, social feelings says: "This and that must be protected," they suddenly no longer know what to make of it. Hunters will simply have to learn to live with it.

[Question] The protection of the woodcock was very enthusiastically received in environmental protection circles. But don't you think that you were left somewhat out in the cold with that decision, because this bird is protected only in the Flanders and not in the rest of Europe?

[Galle] We have done pioneering work here. Two weeks ago, the matter was raised in the Committee on Agriculture of the European Parliament. Among other things, on the initiative of Karel van Miert. And now the woodcock has been put on the list of birds being considered for protection. That is something. Furthermore, you cannot ignore the reaction of all the environmentalist associations. We so often talk about a /base/ [in italics], but there is a real base here. People who are convinced and motivated. You simply become impressed by this. Afterwards, this administration also worked out plans to subsidize such organizations, to compensate the costs of printed matter, for example. Up to now we have paid such a subsidy 8 times and there are 15 files waiting to be signed.

#### Thousand Hectare Forest

[Question] Practically on taking up your duties, you announced two new things: the reform of the old, 19th century forestry code and the establishment of an environmental police force. How far have these projects come?

[Galle] That environmental police force -- at that time, we came up with the term /nature watchmen/ [in italics] -- produced a large response. At that time, people presented themselves at the Waters and Forests Administration, who wanted to work voluntarily and without pay as watchmen. A plan was worked out to set up a staff of such watchmen all over the Flanders, and the only problem was a legal one, namely whether those people had the authority to issue tickets. We could easily have relied on volunteers -- there were certainly enough candidates --, but in the end we decided

on a permanent staff, because we wanted to work in the long term. And now, we have introduced a BTK [expansion unknown] project to take on about 30 of those watchmen.

Then there is the forestry code. After a great deal of toiling, it will be ready in a few weeks and I will -- at least, if I am still here -- introduce it in the Flemish Council as a new decree. In the old version, only the economic function of a forest was emphasized; we have added an ecological, social and educational dimension. We are going to try to open up private forests to the public, just like the forests managed by the public administration. However, there are a few restrictions here. We want to open up the forests to the individual recreation seeker; this must be done with guidance and the biotopes must remain protected, which consequently implies that the whole forest does not get opened up at once. In addition, in the future we would like to see scientific research -- under the supervision of the Waters and Forests Administration -- allowed also in the private forests. All of this does not mean an attack on private property, but the reality is simply this, that private owners often no longer have the means to manage their domain decently. In exchange for the facilities put at the disposal of the community, we want to help them with that management. We want to give them advice, to build roads, to develop the infrastructure, to install benches, garbage cans and shelters, to take out insurance, and all of that at our expense.

[Question] You also buy up forests and woods with clockwork regularity. Won't this buying mania in time be too much for your budget?

[Galle] No, there is a fixed budget provided for this: 750 million francs. The goal is to use that money to buy 1000 hectares every year and after 1 year we were just slightly above that limit. Aside from buying forests, however, we are also proceeding with a study on reforestation. We will probably be able to start with this by next spring.

[Question] You mentioned a not insubstantial amount there. However, these are so to speak welfare expenditures. You create virtually no new jobs with it; aren't you afraid then that in the event of new cuts this would be one of the first items to be scrapped?

[Galle] I agree that these are a kind of welfare expenditure, but at the same time I do believe that they are a good real estate investment. A well managed forest is always profitable. You should also realize that a whole series of other measures relating to the natural or human environment cost us relatively little. We spend approximately 2.3 billion francs a year on water purification, virtually an equal amount on subsidized works; our overall budget approaches 8 billion francs; thus, we are spending less than 10 percent on the purchase of forests. And then there are the jobs. I am well aware that there are investments which produce more jobs. Listen, the restoration of the St Rombouts in Malines also costs me millions of francs a year and I think that that is ~~OK~~. I have no objection to that at all. Every year, I spend 600 million francs on the repair of churches, on the restoration of organs, bells, you name it. What is the effect of all */those/* [in italics] millions on employment? In a manner of speaking, it only provides a livelihood for a few stone masons in Malines.

## Criminal Project

[Question] The subsidizing of the municipalities, that is one of the pet themes of this administration. There has long been talk here of a new, flexible procedure.

[Galle] Up to now, this subsidizing takes place on the basis of a governor's decree. A very good decree, actually, which at the time was even an excellent one. But the whole procedure was too cumbersome; the municipalities had to go through something like 30 stages to get their money. That is irresponsible. We have worked out new legislation now, and if I am a member of the next administration, with the same jurisdictions, this will be the first royal decree to be submitted. This would not only result in making the procedure more flexible, but the matters to be subsidized would also be expanded, simply because times are changing. I attach the greatest importance to this, because this lengthy procedure could cause the municipalities to show a deficit. As a matter of fact, they have to get their money from the Municipal Credit Fund and wait a very long time for repayment. This is no longer acceptable.

[Question] A few months ago, a rather shady file was unloaded on you, namely the waste pipeline between Genk and Antwerp. That investigation does not seem to be going very smoothly.

[Galle] That is a very complicated business. An inheritance from my predecessors, and what an inheritance. Rika De Backer has instructed the High Committee for Oversight to start an investigation; a few of the reports are ready now but the matter is still far from being completed. Of course, the most urgent aspect is the matter of those nine companies which demand compensation plus interest for delay. We must settle this now as soon as possible, otherwise the account will just keep running up; later on, we can sift through everything thoroughly.

This file was pushed over to us and in that case there are two ways to react. You do something about it or else you pretend that you are too busy and I found the latter just a little too much. Billions of francs have been put in the ground there and the system has never worked yet. There is talk of 4.5 billion francs, but with the amounts being spent on expropriation -- it is, after all, an immense distance -- and with the claims, the whole matter comes to 8 or 9 billion francs. I would be irresponsible to just leave it at that and that is why I have offered to take a look to see whether there is at least something useful in the whole system. We now believe that the odds that the pipeline will ever really work are very slim, but ... At that time, I offered to take 100 million francs out of my budget to check, after consultation with the BRT [expansion unknown] and in cooperation with experts from the Ministry of Public Works, what can yet be used. I have presented this proposal to the Council of Ministers and there I was instructed to prepare a white paper. I will do that.

It is simply a crazy project. The covering of those pipes is already coming loose. When you run a few liters of chloroform through them, then everything goes to pot. Furthermore, the construction of those pipes was assigned in various parts to various companies. The composition of those pipes differs substantially, and naturally they all react differently to certain liquids which are run through them. Perhaps we will have to tell people: "Listen, all that money is stuck underground and nothing can be done with it." Let us then at least be that honest. But I find this simply criminal.



## MARTENS INTERVIEWED ON POSSIBLE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC REFORMS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 29 Oct 80 pp 26-29

[Interview with Prime Minister Wilfried Martens by Frans Verleyen and Johan Struye: "Martens IV: Seventy Billion for a Sick Country"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Last Saturday, CVP [Social Christian Party-Flemish] Prime Minister Wilfried Martens attended an academic meeting in Antwerp, in honor of the 100th birthday of the late Minister of State Frans Van Cauwelaert. The pick of the CVP which was present there, in honor of its historic leader, could not contain its amusement when the greying socialist excellency Hendrik Fayat told about a long ago session of parliament. Everyone thought about Komen, because there was talk of an interpellation by young PSC [Christian Social Party-French] member Harmel addressed to Minister of Education Van Cauwelaert about the construction of a public elementary school. Kamiel Huysmans presided over parliament. Member of parliament Carton de Wiart also thought at the time that the constitution was being violated. This was followed by such an exchange of "it is" and "it isn't," that Huysmans reacted: but, gentlemen, at our age!

Also thinking about Komen, these days Wilfried Martens is experiencing a great desire for a little more historic depth among the politicians and in the so-called speech making community. Indeed, a great deal of what is scornfully referred to in the newspapers as "politicians' politics" is as old as the democratic practices themselves. When Wilfried Martens puts together a government -- which seems to occur more frequently day by day -- more than 80 percent of the portfolios and officials are already fixed. For the remaining fifth, the parties then announce their deliberate choices, which inevitably conflict with the deliberate choice of another party. Even though Wilfried Martens never wants to give up so much, public opinion should not doubt the deliberate choice of the CVP for the Ministry of Defense, as a result of which, due to traditional legality, they could not lay claim to the Ministry of Justice. The extent of the moderation, and of the social risks connected with it, especially in Wallonia, can be deduced from the fact that, with Philippe Moureaux at the Ministry of Justice and Guy Mathot at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Walloon socialists are now two-thirds politically responsible for the maintenance of order. Here a shield was set up for the Belgian state, a shield covered with a piece of the state's own skin.



CVP member Gaston Geens from Louvain is the brother of Minister of State Vandeppeereboom, the nephew of the great Beernaert, and without any doubt the only real grandson of Frans Van Cauwelaert. He could be Galopin and his committee all in one. It is rare for a single man to have united so much Belgian establishment into himself, whereby he now acts as if he were the prime minister of an autonomous Flemish country. Now, the front people have had to bite the dirt for that; Wilfried Martens managed to arrange it that way. The only thing that this loyal plumber of the fatherland's system apparently did not manage to make right this time, seems to be the participation -- which is considered necessary -- of the female majority of the population in its highest decision making body.

[Question] Are we going to have to learn to live permanently now with the humiliation of women, now that nobody of that sex became minister? How could this possibly have happened in a Martens administration?

[Wilfried Martens] I consider the emancipation of women in all areas, including the political area, to be one of the inevitable, definite and resolutely to be desired renovations in society. I admit this so easily because, as former party president, I have an unimpeachable record in this regard. But I find that this emancipation is going through a crisis. There are political circumstances which can lead to a freeze, which has occurred now. The shock can only be healthy. Let women once again cultivate their emancipation with readiness to fight.

[Question] Had things already become easy for them?

[Martens] They themselves have to make it true. It is obvious to me that soon, maybe 10 years from now, the question will no longer be whether there will be 4 or 6 women among the 20 ministers, but how to find half that amount of /men/ [in italics] for the government. That is the real question.

[Question] What direction are you going to go with the social debate? The union world is isolated in public opinion; it no longer has any room to maneuver. It is generally assumed that the government will have to decide if no agreement is reached. The right has put those pliers in your hands, and it believes that you should actually already cut through. Is it possible for politics yet to offer a solution here?

[Martens] The question you have raised here is a question of all times. It is necessary to have a sense of history in politics, because the wage question constantly determined the life of our cities in the Middle Ages. Throughout the whole history of the Netherlands -- which, incidentally, in its heyday, stood at the top of the industrial culture of the civilized world of its time -- runs the red thread of the social struggle. Over and over again, there came the time when the sovereign demanded additional taxes, and that is what we are experiencing right now. There is, indeed, an aversion to unions in public opinion, but primarily to the staff of the unions, which was expressed very sharply, for example, at the latest congress of our party. If P.W. Segers or Jos De Saeger had still been there, they would have blown their stack. But even if there is such an aversion to the union staff, this does not make the reality less than it is. The reality is specifically that a teacher or similar bread winner with five children has difficulty making ends meet with his salary. I know that there are profiteers in our country, in the parastatal area and elsewhere, but not among the workers and employees. It is said that the people themselves want to economize. But who says that? Some people claim that everybody is willing to reduce his income. I would only be convinced of this

provided that the offer is spread fairly, because certain levels of the population simply have nothing to cut back. This is why two fundamental safety bolts have been built into the recovery plan. In the Netherlands, the administration does affect the price adjustment, as they call it there, but here the automatic indexing will be maintained in any case. Secondly, we will not touch modest wages.

[Question] Why do you like this country so much?

[Martens] A person can never give a complete answer to this, but I believe that I share with my compatriots their great sense of good and well done work, their sense of reality and the material world, and finally, in spite of all appearances often to the contrary, their great tolerance. And why don't you ask me: does Belgium still make any sense?

[Question] Yes, with pleasure.

[Martens] Yes, it does, but on a new basis. Soon we will be able to consider the autonomy of the communities and of the regions as completed; the next urgent business is the overall economic recovery. You may assume that what is included in the recovery plan is as much Wilfried Martens', as it was said that the state reform was Wilfried Martens'. I have spent 18 months attentively listening and studying. I now talk about the economy as I used to talk about the state and its reform. I only say those things of which I have really become convinced. I have sometimes surprised my economic staff with the admission that I am a peasant, that I come from that milieu. This means that my basic reaction is that the accounts must agree, that expenses must be cut.

[Question] The alarm has never sounded so shrilly. Aren't you afraid of the predicted unfeasibility of the budget then?

[Martens] Don't say that before the impact of the recovery plan on the budget becomes noticeable. My analysis shows that, in spite of the crisis, the family share in the national income has increased since 1973, at the expense of businesses and the state. Well, we are introducing a basic change of direction here. That is the whole recovery plan. Those who will soon meet for the social debate know what it is about and know what the solution is. What then would keep us from implementing that solution?

[Question] What is your own answer to that question?

[Martens] There is really no need for an answer from me. I am only trying to maintain a minimum of continuity within the state.

[Question] The calculation that a one year wage freeze, without touching the indexing, would represent a reduction of expenditures by 30 billion francs, is well known. Plus 15 billion from savings in social security, 12 billion in increased contributions, the 6 billion from the civil servants and 5 billion from the liberal professions, gives us 68 billion francs for recovery. But the 6 billion from the public sector has nearly caused a landslide already.

[Martens] With, on top of that, the revenues from the tax operation, the savings on energy, and the direct support to small and medium size businesses, I am convinced that with those kinds of figures I will be able to implement a real recovery.

[Question] Why were you willing to risk your job last month for the school in Komen?

[Martens] I don't recall that I ever tied my fate explicitly to that school. The only thing I did was, in my capacity of government leader, to state categorically that I owed it to myself to solve that problem, and that I would not allow this to destabilize the life of an adult nation. How did we, in the government, interpret the law? When the municipality did not live up to its duty, we could of course have started the whole set of procedures originating from the central administration, with a government commissioner, the implementation of guardianship, you name it. But it is precisely because we did not want the excitement of a few individuals in Komen to destabilize the kingdom, that we made a deliberate decision in favor of the implementation of the law by the state. The intent of the 1963 law was excellent. If there was a request from 16 parents within a municipality for minority language elementary education, then the law provided that the municipality must respond. Why? Because the municipal administration is capable of organizing an education which, in spite of our ideological differences, responds to the prevailing opinion. Our municipal administrations are the most suitable structure to organize municipal education. But if, as was the case in Komen, you are confronted with expressions of fanaticism, it goes without saying that the municipality is precisely no longer capable of fulfilling the meaning of the law. Then it is precisely this meaning of the law which requires that the state, which is a stronger and higher authority, put itself in the place of the weakened municipal administration. Consequently, there can be no question of violation of the law or of the constitution; on the contrary, what the government achieved in Komen was nothing more than the application of the law in its deepest meaning. And when it is further proven that those 16 children have given up, as the letter of the law requires, then it is once again the meaning of the law that the school be maintained anyway. The school was only the school, but there was more at stake. All the rest is nonsense, if you forgive my saying so. This is why I told our parliamentary parties in Houffalize that if the cabinet had not made the decision concerning the school in Komen, it would never have been established. In that case we would still be muddling along with an unwilling municipal administration, and a few hotheads would really have succeeded in destabilizing the Belgian state. Which did not happen.

[Question] If we were to say to this that your version seems to be the nicest example of applied casuistry since the confessor of Louis XIV, perhaps you would respond that the threatened stability of the Belgian state is worth the whole order of the Jesuits to you. But why that horse trading? Did that road really have to come out of the same night time deliberations as did the little school?

[Martens] This is why I also stated in Houffalize that nobody in Belgium should consider himself called to govern, as long as he does not yet realize that it is never possible to give one side satisfaction with a decision, without providing a psychological counter-service to the other side. This has nothing to do with whether this state is decadent in character or not, it is simply a natural law of politics, of all politics since Anaximenes of Miletus. Furthermore, the second part of the decision was purely and solely a decision made by our own Flemish regional government, including the opening up of Molen. And that decision is at least a full year old. Besides, the Flemish executive now has to answer politically to the Flemish Council, and nowhere else, because this is where this matter belongs. Since the formation of the regions, the national parliament no longer has anything to do with it.



[Question] Wouldn't it have been politically more useful to give up the Komen affair at the point of dealing with the elusive class out of a sense of juridical strictness, and in exchange for that, from the Flemish side, to question the whole system of special language facilities?

[Martens] I am not resigned to it, but I do not see the whole Brussels situation suddenly changing because of a single Flemish concession. It is precisely with an eye on the linguistic homogeneity of our regions, and on the valuable balance of our country, that we must continue to accept special language facilities in a limited number of municipalities. But then on the single condition that reciprocity is granted without discussion. If the Walloons do not start realizing this better and applying it, then there will be a nasty backlash which would indeed once again threaten the whole system. Then I would be stuck again with a destabilized country.

[Question] Considering that you no longer have a two-thirds majority, are you dependent now on offers from outside the majority for a Brussels settlement? Do you have any idea yet of the political price you will have to pay for it?

[Martens] Do you remember that in the days of Egmont, the question was raised of whether the Flemish territory had jurisdiction over the border municipalities? Now, there is no longer even the slightest discussion about that, not even in terms of guardianship. I have always been convinced that the Flanders would become tolerant only when it acquired its self-government. We now have the Flemish regional government and the Flemish Council, which, due to their sovereignty, should be able to settle the fate of their minorities in a just manner. We are always talking about 1302, but we forget 1382. At that time, the Flemish kept the French army for weeks from crossing the bridge over the Leie, specifically at the small locality of Komen. Their leader was Philips van Artevelde. When the French finally managed to get across the water, the foot soldiers themselves murdered their leader Philips, because the odds were changing. That is completely the Flanders for you. At the time, the French king had a rug made, which he called Philips van Artevelde and on which he wiped his feet. In the same era, as Gaston Eyskens would put it, the Swiss permanently gained their independence.

[Question] In what direction are you going to settle the question of the capital?

[Martens] In order to solve the question, the two communities within the capital will have to acquire autonomy and participate on the basis of equivalence in the municipal councils and institutions.

[Question] When, during the CVP congress in Ghent, the conclusion of secret agreements was criticized, the 600 members of the congress burst into applause. After the applause, not a single person seemed to know who was being criticized or why.

[Martens] There are no secret agreements in this area. The chairman only issued a warning in general. One ingredient of my Brussels settlement will also involve a certain merger of the capital's municipalities. My equivalence in Brussels is not a quantitative, but a qualitative item. In certain proposals, this means that the Flemish would have the right to at least two aldermen and two administrators in the OCMW [expansion unknown] of each municipality. The remainder then can depend on the political agreements.



[Question] Will Zeebrugge become an historic decision from the period of the Martens administrations?

[Martens] There were protests at the CVP congress against the attitude of the people from Antwerp with regard to Zeebrugge. Minister of Public Works Jos Chabert had requested a clear decision from the administration, prior to our going on vacation. After all those years and all those billions of francs, it is proper for us to continue with Zeebrugge. If you have already gotten that many hundreds of meters into the sea, then you simply have to lengthen those breakers further, or the whole enterprise remains senseless. If you have already built a lock, you are not going to leave it unused. This is why the breakers are necessary. The only remaining question, of course, is what we are going to do with the space which has thus been created. If there were a minister in the administration now like Leopold II's Minister De Bruyne, then he might well have reluctantly insisted, for 20 years, on the construction of a full harbor. It has been claimed that we have allowed NATO to shove such a large Zeebrugge down our throats, but that is not true. The Americans already come into their own with the current infrastructure. After the West Flemings took the offensive at the congress in Ghent, it became apparent that the majority of our party supports the expansion of Zeebrugge.

[Question] When you formed the three party coalition, everybody pityingly wondered when the socialists would fall off the swing. In the end, it was the liberals who bowed out. When you were appointed "formateur" for the first time in your life, you said that the axis of your political thought was a coalition of Christian democrats and socialists. Why did we have to wait for three Roman numerals for such a cabinet? When the Martens III administration was sworn in, you convincingly explained how good that government was. Would you like to explain now how bad that Martens III administration was?

[Martens] Of course, I am not to blame for the detour over other coalitions. I am only there for the continuity of the state. However, the Martens III administration played its role beautifully during the days when the regionalization was piloted through parliament with great physical and intellectual effort.

[Question] Aren't we, according to your own party's study center, paying for that regionalization -- for which it was necessary to have the liberals in the majority -- with an additional dislocation of the public finances?

[Martens] Read the general explanatory statement on the 1981 budget. I remain faithful to that, contrary to Minister Hatry, for example. It states that next year 35 billion francs less will be received from direct taxation, but 25 billion francs more from indirect taxation. The balance is a sum of 10 billion francs less to be levied in taxes. In all the brutality of the base figures, this is also an advantage which the Belgian population will be able to thank the Martens III administration for.

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## PAPER'S EDITOR COMMENTS ON KEKKONEN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 12 Nov 80 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "The State Visit"]

[Text] Today, when tensions are increasing in the world and maneuvering room for international diplomacy is shrinking, the direct, bilateral relations between Finland and the Soviet Union take on a particular importance, says Jan-Magnus Jansson in a commentary on the president's state visit to the Soviet Union.

It has been three and one-half years since President Kekkonen's last state visit to the Soviet Union in May 1977. Three and one-half years is not a long time, but during that time the political scene has undergone considerable change.

In 1977 we still lived, especially in Europe, in that optimistic atmosphere of relaxed great-power relations which was created at the beginning of the 1970's and which culminated in the KSSE [human rights] meeting in Helsinki. But toward the end of the same year the somber mood and the many complications at the follow-up conference in Belgrade gave warning that the climate of cooperation had worsened. Nor did the Vienna negotiations on arms limitation reveal any signs of progress. In spite of that, we hoped that the inherent dynamics of the KSSE process would prove sufficiently strong to overcome the obstacles and lead to increased cooperation in Europe.

Today great-power relations are worse than they have been for years. As this is being written we do not know whether there will be an agenda for the KSSE meeting in Madrid, and which turn the meeting will take. In any case the prospects for the meeting are not bright. On the plus side one can certainly say that on both sides in Europe there is a clear struggle in spite of everything to preserve the fruits of detente in some form. From the third world, however, new subjects of conflict steadily arise which, no matter how much we would like to avoid it, easily become involved in great-power relations, and thereby also influence the European situation.

In such an international atmosphere, personal contact and exchange of ideas between the heads of state of Finland and the Soviet Union have their own significance. It is known that major personnel changes in the Soviet leadership have taken place

since 1977. Two of the members of the so-called leadership troika have left their posts since then, Podgorniy (whose departure from party leadership was reported on the last day of the state visit) and Kosygin. President Leonid Brezhnev's position has grown stronger accordingly. New men have stepped forward, and still others have been promoted, probably with the thought of future higher positions. It is a circumstance which makes new contacts between the Finnish and the Soviet leadership even more important.

The more tension increases in the world, the less maneuvering room for multilateral diplomacy seems to exist in Europe, the more important become the direct bilateral relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Also, during the best days of detente these relations became the nucleus of our foreign policy. We used to say that our relations are not overshadowed by swings in the market. By that we meant that they were not influenced by changes in the international situation. In a way that has also been tested this year. Relying on the stability of our relations with the Soviet Union, Finland can live in relative security in spite of the difficulties in great-power relations last winter. The Soviet Union in turn could rely on its loyal neighbor to the northwest.

Since major political problems no longer exist in our mutual relations, the main interest has been concentrated on economic cooperation. Soviet trade during recent years has reached a significant level in our balance of trade. Its importance for several branches of our economy is recognized as vital. That especially applies to the shipbuilding industry which, with the protection of regular, timely, and appropriate orders from the Soviet Union, can work without the difficulties which beset the other market economic countries.

But also the other metal industries have to a large extent been able to build on the Soviet market, and recent years have brought a welcome market for the forest industry and for some consumer goods, among them some which used to be classified as in a state of crisis. And obviously also for the construction industry, within the framework of the so-called export project.

The most comprehensive framework for total economic cooperation is being established now by the so-called long-range agreement which will run until 1990. It was signed, as is known, at the time of President Kekkonen's previous state visit and it is intended to be renewed in expanded form to run until 1995.

The long-range plan can be called an expression of the political will to maintain, develop, and plan our economic relations under a longer period of time than the 5-year period which traditionally covered agreements between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Soviets have often advocated the principal importance of long-range agreements as models for comprehensive cooperation between countries with different economic systems. The agreement can also be regarded as "all inclusive" in another sense, more than the limited agreement which we now have. It includes ten different types of cooperation, with trade in the traditional sense being only one.

The agreement is at the same time more than just a declaration of good intentions. It is particularly detailed concerning different groups of goods or cooperative projects. It is clear that during such a long time as 15 years a number of conditions

on which the agreement is built will be obsolete. The current long-range agreement anticipates that the value of trade during 1981 to 1985 will grow to 12 billion rubles. The 5-year agreement signed in 1979, however, calculated a mutual trade of 14 billion rubles, largely based on increased oil prices, although these are compensated for by increased deliveries from our side.

Stability as the basis for relations, and development of concrete forms of cooperation, have been the criteria for relations between Finland and the Soviet Union for a long time. That they will continue in the future is a fundamental condition of our security and our welfare.

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## NAVAL WEAPONS EXPORTS INCREASING

Paris LE MATIN in French 4 Nov 80 pp 17-18

[Article by Jean-Gabriel Fredet: "Arms Exports: France Gets Its Sea Legs"]

[Text] Our textile industry is becoming frayed. Our automobile industry is marking time. Our computer industry takes its cues from American firms. Our electronics industry is dominated by the Nipponese invader. And our steel industry is flawed. But cheer up, unlike the aforementioned, the French arms industry is doing very well. Its volume of business this year will be close to 30 billion francs. National arms manufacturers will earn nearly 20 billion francs in export sales, the new "must" for industrial firms. And what about the effect of this export trade on employment? At a time when all sectors of the economy are pruning payrolls, arms manufacturers are hiring. A combined total of about 290,000 persons are currently employed by aircraft manufacturers, engine manufacturers, arsenals, electronics and radar firms, ammunition plants, and shipyards.

The arms industry is a high technology industry in that it utilizes the latest technological advances. It is also an export industry which by itself alone pays for one-fifth of the oil we buy. And according to the men who govern us, it is an industry consistent with our independence. Without sales in foreign markets, there would, in fact, be no chance of increasing our production runs, lowering our costs, and hence of making national projects economically feasible, projects on which our defense bases its independence and its refusal to rejoin NATO's integrated forces. This reasoning is faultless, even though it definitely smacks of sophistry. The United States and the Soviet Union have superabundant stocks of military materiel, thereby enabling them to engage in the most savage dumping practices. Nevertheless, the French arms industry's performance against such competition is not to be disdained.

Not so long ago, our best products were aircraft and armored vehicles. For each aircraft ordered by the French Air Force, our industry exported an average of three. Today, the appeal of these products has apparently peaked. And there is even some talk of obsolescent products. This explains why there is a certain disaffection among the younger purchasing countries who want their equipment to represent the last word in technology and engineering. Lastly, there is the naval materiel industry, a sector in which France has traditionally suffered from a handicap, namely the high cost of its products and a certain inability

to meet delivery schedules. American miscalculations in the Middle East and the anxiousness of third-party countries to avoid the Soviet Union's monopoly have currently given French diplomacy some very powerful sales arguments. And with apparently some successful results, because in less than 2 months, French manufacturers of naval-related equipment have garnered contracts totaling 16 billion francs.

This sum of 16 billion francs is equal to 3 percent of the French national budget, or to the cost of 5 nuclear power plants, or to one-tenth of the country's 1980 oil bill. It is the total amount of two naval-materiel sales contracts awarded to France by Persian Gulf countries. In September, the Technical Directorate for Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering (DTCA) succeeded in selling Qatar three guided-missile fast patrol boats, as well as a technical assistance program for the boat crews. Value of the deal: 1.5 billion francs. A mere appetizer, however.

On 14 October, Joel Le Theule, the recently appointed defense minister, signed a special document in Paris while Prince Sultan signed a copy of the same document in Riyadh. This document was a contract for Saudi Arabia's purchase of "a complete ready-made navy." It is a 14.5-billion franc bonanza calling for the delivery of, among other "items," four 2,000-ton guided missile frigates, 2 replenishment fleet tankers, and 22 Dauphin helicopters armed with antiship missiles.

Designated by the code name "Suvari," this naval program will provide more than 8 million hours of work for French naval and private shipyards, plus some 10 million hours of work for the suppliers of weapon systems. These suppliers include one state-owned firm, Aerospatiale, and two private firms, Matra and Thomson-CSF. And there is probably more to come. The French Navy will also train Saudi personnel and, for an initial period, handle equipment maintenance.

These two contracts may not be the end of the list. For instance, in the Technical Directorate for Maritime Affairs it is whispered that the "diplomacy of action" has still not stopped trying in Iraq. Gerard Hibon, the director of international affairs in the Ministry of Defense, is reportedly on the point of attempting a final breakthrough in an effort to "bypass" the Italian Navy in Iraq. Before the war with Tehran, the Italian Navy was planning to sell Baghdad some 10 naval vessels at unbeatable prices. But with or without Iraq, French manufacturers of naval materiel are definitely in luck.

The foreign market is now relieving the domestic market, even though the latter was recently given a new boost by the government's decision to build two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to replace the Clemenceau and the Foch. Naval materiel has heretofore annually represented not more than 5 percent of all foreign arms sales. Such materiel has emerged at the right moment to replace Marcel Dassault Mirage aircraft and Panhard AMX (armored vehicles) on the list of "must" export items. In addition, this year, our manufacturers were given a "showcase" in which to exhibit their equipment for naval forces--the Naval Show at Le Bourget--an event that speaks volumes about French ambitions.

It was a rather strange showcase, with its soft music, periwinkle-blue carpeting, ceiling draped with indigo cloth, and models serving as hostesses. Looking solely at the decor, it was hard to imagine that the primary purpose of the Naval Show at Le Bourget was to sell arms. Yet the introduction to the 1980 catalog, written by Jean Martre, the government's delegate general for armament, is quite clear. It states, in the most official terms, that this seventh edition, like its predecessors, is meant "to enable representatives of friendly navies to appraise the means which French industry can offer to help them meet their requirements." The full import of this administrative aphorism becomes clear in the light of such situations as the Iraqi-Iranian War, the destabilization of the Middle East, the build-up of the Soviet fleet in the Red Sea, the determination of industrial countries to secure their energy supplies along with freedom of navigation in the straits, and lastly, the extension of the economic sovereignty of coastal states to a 200-nautical mile zone.

French manufacturers are prepared more than ever before to sell the following to France's friends: attack or surveillance ships, missiles and weapon systems, electronic equipment, and airborne equipment capable of preserving the integrity of their territory, guarding their borders and repelling or neutralizing possible aggression. They are ready to sell such equipment provided, of course, buyers can pay in hard currencies, or have the raw materials, natural resources, or geographical advantages that can be used to barter with suppliers.

#### No List Price

It must be clearly understood, however, that liberalism has its limits. Mixing arms sales and transfer of technology, or business and disclosure of production secrets is absolutely out of the question. Before the opening of the Naval Show, a security board led by a clutch of admirals scrupulously screened all of the equipment displayed. Any imprudent exhibitor found exposing an item "top secret" equipment to the prying eyes of visitors had to immediately withdraw it from his exhibit.

Nit-picking? Certainly not. The chief attractions of the seventh Naval Show, which has just ended, conclusively established that this is the era of marine electronics. Evidence of this can be seen, for example, in the Thomson-CSF naval mine-hunting sonar capable of detecting and classifying mines by means of its acoustic camera. At the same time, this device can dispel the misgivings of small navies obsessed by the appearance of a periscope. This sonar equipment is virtually unrivaled in the mine warfare field, except by the American system developed by Raytheon. Further evidence of the electronic era is furnished by the helicopter-borne thermal camera developed by TRT (Radio and Telephone Telecommunications Company) for missile firing. TRT infrared cameras are unquestionably unrivaled in their thermographic and night vision capabilities, both indispensable in combat operations. The same can be said of TRT altimeters which enable aircraft to skim over the waves and thus avoid detection by enemy radars. Only the Honeywell and Bendix altimeters can stand comparison with the TRT product.

But there are also prototypes that are only waiting for a customer to become operational. One such prototype is the Naviplane N300 Mk.2 built by the

Dubigeon-Normandy shipyards. Because of the geometry of its biconic skirt, this amphibious hovercraft's air cushions can carry 120 soldiers and one AMX armored vehicle at a speed of 45 knots--nearly 90 kilometers per hour--in waves with 2-meter troughs. There is, of course, no actual list price for this surface effect vehicle. In its armored version, however, this special type of car ferry would reportedly cost a little more than 160 million francs. It is, therefore no surprise that it did at one time attract the Iranian Navy which, in the days of Shah Reza Pahlavi, dreamt of transforming the Gulf into a Persian inland sea. But there are also such "standard" weapon systems as Matra's Otomat missile that will arm the future Saudi frigates. For some Arab countries like Egypt, this surface-to-surface antiship missile is already an old acquaintance. In fact, the Naval Show at Le Bourget featured a 1 to 150 scale model depicting the coastal defense system installed in Egypt by Matra in 1979, for the tidy sum of 2 billion francs. The written description of the system's operation, displayed near the model, imparts a certain biblical simplicity to this kriegsspiel. Offshore, beyond the 38 kilometer-range which constitutes the visible horizon, a helicopter, tracked by a radar, maintains surveillance of the sea over a radius of 160 kilometers. Upon the approach of an enemy vessel, the helicopter transmits the ship's position and range to the onshore shelter housing the command post, thereby triggering the following sequence of actions culminating in the terminal phase: "the tactical commander assigns the target, transmits target data directly to the firing vehicle--a Berliet truck equipped with launchers--and issues the order to launch the missile." Obtaining this contract created quite a stir because this weapon system which "extends the limits of naval combat" represented 15 percent--2 billion francs--of total military sales.

#### Government-to-Government Contracts

Another "standard" item of equipment--this one being more specifically naval--is the Agosta-class attack submarine built by Dubigeon-Normandy. Although conventionally-powered, this submarine can travel faster than 20 knots at great depths. It is ideal for those countries who want to equip themselves with a submarine fleet. In fact, France has sold two of them to Pakistan, and views some South American countries like Argentina as promising markets.

Submarines for Pakistan, patrol boats for Qatar, coastal batteries for Egypt, electronic equipment for Norway, etc. Though Arab countries of the Middle East are among the chief customers of French shipyards, and missile and munitions manufacturers, these French firms have no intention of excluding any country from their sales promotion efforts. This year, some 51 foreign delegations visited the Le Bourget Naval Show. A few Sundays ago, a chartered Airbus flew them to Brest where they were able to inspect the French Navy's "brightest jewels"--ranging from the submarine Psyche to the corvette Georges-Leygues--and witness demonstration flights by such aircraft as the Super Etendard and Atlantic Mk.1, plus the Super Frelon (helicopter). One of the Naval Show's 80 exhibitors signed: "The level of our visitors is no longer what it formerly was. This year, the average level of the heads of delegation was not above assistant chief of staff." He also told us, in a low voice, that the big contracts are now being increasingly negotiated bilaterally on a government-to-government basis, and as a result, potential contracting parties are shown special consideration.



Consideration and small acts of courtesy to which this seventh Naval Show's three "big winners" can devote themselves. Thomson-CSF to begin with. Nothing of interest to naval forces is apparently foreign to this huge firm. Its spectrum of products ranges from helicopter-borne radars, electronic missile components, and proximity fuzes to tracer-trajectory antimissile missiles and laser-guided attack systems produced in cooperation with Martin Marietta, an American firm. Obviously more content as a contractor for foreign armed forces than as a supplier of telephone exchanges or manufacturer of mass-market products under Japanese license, Thomson-CSF proudly stresses the point that it is a "major" participant in the Saudi Navy's upgrade and expansion program.

In fact, the total amount of all the contracts awarded to Thomson-CSF should be nearly one-third of the overall Saudi package deal. This is quite logical, after all. With the growing role of electronics installed aboard maritime patrol ships, Thomson-CSF is literally exploding. It is capable of supplying not only shipboard search radars and their associated data-processing equipment, but also electronic countermeasures systems as well as air defense missiles. It is likewise eminently capable of supplying airborne equipment. The Dauphin patrol helicopters to be based on the Saudi ships are to be fitted with Thomson-CSF's famous Agrion radar. This radar can locate and designate targets for the missiles and then guide them to the targets with unerring accuracy. These Saudi contracts are a magnificent bonanza for a firm which not so long ago was awarded a contract to supply Shahine and Crotale missile systems for the anti-aircraft defense of Saudi armored units and bases. Thomson-CSF has also supplied almost all the equipment for the Saudi television system.

Since the beginning of the Iranian crisis, all Persian Gulf countries have realized that their oil fields are strategic objectives. The Iraqi-Iranian War has now taught them that in the event of open conflict, billions of offshore petroleum assets are liable to be destroyed. As explained by one of Matra's export managers: "This is enough reason for them to put two irons in the fire by adding a powerful navy to their existing air force and thereby transform their economic patrimony into a sanctuary." Like Thomson, Matra has developed naval material, and with as much success as its air-to-air missiles. For example, 5 foreign navies have ordered some 450 naval surface-to-surface Otomat missiles as armament for about 40 ships which range from a light hydrofoil to a frigate serving as a helicopter carrier. A rather nice showing in a market whose unit of account is approximately 10 million francs.

#### Air Fleets Nearing Saturation

Aerospatiale is not lagging behind these two private firms. The day after the Naval Show opened, General Jacques Mitterrand, Aerospatiale's president, held a lavish reception in the Gabriel Pavilion off the Champs Elysees to celebrate the sale of its thousandth Exocet antiship missile. This missile (MM-38) has gradually replaced heavy naval guns in 24 navies and made battleships of the Jean Bart class or Richelieu class obsolescent. Some 180 combat ships are now armed with Exocet missiles. Aerospatiale has also developed a whole range of "navalized" helicopters, including the Dauphin 2 and the Super Puma, not to mention air-to-surface missiles. Moreover, it is about to introduce a successor to the Exocet, namely the MM-40 naval surface-to-surface missile. Like

previous versions, it homes in on targets designated by its electronic computer. It has a velocity of Mach 2 and a range of 65 kilometers. The French Navy and the Saudi have already decided to buy the MM-40.

Whether competitors or partners, Thomson, Matra, and Aerospatiale all agree on one point. While air fleets are probably nearing the saturation point, the market for naval armament has not finished its expansion. For at least three reasons: the introduction of weapon systems, the DTCN's (Technical Directorate for Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering) newly established credibility as an exporter, and the now accepted participation of private shipyards in contracts heretofore awarded exclusively to naval shipyards.

The emphasis currently placed on the weapon system concept or arms package deal? A Matra executive explained this emphasis as follows: "Our customers increasingly want to deal with one complete supplier who furnishes them--in "turnkey" condition, so to speak--everything they need. In fact, dealing with one single negotiating partner, a single prime contractor who acts as chief contract negotiator and commits himself on as large a package as possible, is highly conducive to settling subsequent interface problems that are often inadequately foreseen at the time agreement is reached on the contract." The Matra executive then added: "Once our government has issued its diplomatic guidelines, the manufacturers who enter the competition for a foreign contract must understand that they form part of a team, the French team vying with the American, British, or Italian team. It is up to the manufacturers who make up that team--engine, missile, and radar manufacturers, and shipyards--to offer the best equipment so that customers buy the French system." This message has apparently been received, because "the French team appears regularly in the finals or quarterfinals."

While amplification of the weapon-system concept is the surest guarantee of the development of naval armament, the newly established credibility of the DTCN should also contribute to this development. By managing, under the nose of the Americans, to sell the Gulf countries two veritable "ready-made" navies, the DTCN gave us a timely reminder of its power and glory. People somewhat quickly forget that of the 290,000 employees in France's arms industry, nearly 10 percent are employed by the DTCN. Moreover, the latter's shipyards in Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, and Toulouse do not limit themselves to building, and maintaining ships. All of these shipyards are also engaged in highly advanced research in such different fields as acoustics, propulsion, and ballistics. Up to now, naval shipyards--public enterprises par excellence--were considered too expensive in comparison with their British or Italian competitors. The recent Middle East contracts indicate that technical references--the French corvette Georges-Leygues is at the top of the U.S. Navy's ratings--may have overcome this handicap.

The last factor favorable to French exporters of naval materiel is the current effort to remove the compartmentalization which exists between naval shipyards and private shipyards. The former have traditionally been the only ones to receive military contracts. In contrast, since the recession of 1975, the order books of the private shipyards--20,000 employees and total earnings of 7 billion francs--have been unusually "lean." In deciding to have private

shipyards share in export orders, the government may be giving itself the means of competing on equal terms with foreign shipyards. The latter quite obviously have no such shipyard dichotomy and as a result were better able to weather the lean years while at the same time developing advanced shipbuilding techniques.

But will the private shipyards be able to accept this new challenge? Some of them, like Dubigeon-Normandy and Felix Amiot Shipyards, are already building surveillance ships, attack frigates, patrol ships, and fast gunboats. There are also two other private yards that have amply demonstrated their technical talents, namely La Ciotat and the Mediterranean Marine and Industrial Engineering Company (CNIM) at La Seyne-sur-Mer. The CNIM, in particular, has gradually curtailed its manufacture of relatively standard products and diversified into the offshore and mechanical engineering sectors. The case of the Osirak reactor designed for Iraq and whose core was built in part by CNIM, says a great deal about the firm's capabilities. In any case, the Ministry of Defense has definitely recognized these capabilities. Under the Saudi contract, the La Ciotat shipyards are to build the two tanker ships and CNIM three of the four frigates.

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## PRESENT, FUTURE BALANCE BETWEEN LABOR UNIONS, POLITICS

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[Article by Jean Dubois: "Unions and Politics: Rival Partners"]

[Excerpts] French trade-unionism is too politicized. Employers and employees find themselves, for once, in agreement on this point. The opinion samples confirm it: all employees, if one is to believe them, would tear up their cards if their unions were less politically involved. As for the employers, they are all ready to talk with the unions if they would only stop obeying political slogans. How often one hears such envious exclamations as "Ah, if we only had--like the Germans, the Swedes or the Americans--unions that are not engaged in politics, how much better everything would go!"

This refrain is nurtured by the most recent events. The CGT is polarized by the prospect of the presidential election, and the sole aim of its tactics seems to be to rally the largest possible number of discontents to the candidacy of George Marchais. The alliance between the CGT and the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], despite a test of stamina, has not been able to survive the splitup of the left, which has even extended to the traditionally apolitical unions, which are deviating from their usual prudence: the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel] is brandishing the prospect of running a candidate for the presidency under its own colors, while Mr Bergeron--on a personal basis, to be sure--announces his preference for Mitterrand. One wonders whether E. Maire's statement--"The CGT does not work in favor of trade-unionism"--should be applied to all the union organizations. That, at least, is what might easily be thought by a good many wage-earners who, flabbergasted and disillusioned, contemplate the fratricidal struggles and can easily extend to their unions the spontaneous scorn that they already feel for the political parties: "All this is just a lot of intriguing; those people think of us only when they need our votes." A certain employer, as an interested spectator, rubs his hands as he predicts the de-unionization of the French wage-earners.

This present reality raises again a number of disputes that are more fundamental but no less traditional. What is the true mission of trade-unionism: to defend particular interests or to promote a type of society? What is the domain of politics: is it an activity reserved to some specialists and ensconced in a few institutions, or should it permeate all areas of social life? What is the normal relation between parties and unions: should they be allied, amalgamated or divided? All these themes have been taken up periodically for more than a century without any unanimous conception resulting.



What is to be said today, then, that is not old hat? Must one be content with an attitude of resignation: the politicization of the unions has always existed among us and will continue on while being ceaselessly denounced? Such an attitude--by far the most widespread one--is not an innocent one. To stick with stereotyped images is to avoid looking at what is happening in front of one and questioning one's attitude. Furthermore, what a marvellous alibi the theme of politicization is: it is manna to those who refuse to commit themselves as well as to those who want first of all to preserve their autocratic power. Among partners who are otherwise divided, an extraordinary complicity helps maintain images as clear-cut as Epinal intaglio.

Without pretending to deny the reality of the facts that nourish the most widespread views, we would like to stand back a bit and ask three ingenuous questions. Is French trade-unionism really so politicized as is said? Is the politicization of trade-unionism a shameful blemish that should be got rid of at any cost? Are not the relations between parties and unions in the process of taking on new forms?

### The Realm of Cliches

Cliche is king when the politicization of the French trade unions is spoken of. A look at foreign countries leads one to the opposite conclusion. Nearly everywhere else, parties and unions are united by organic and institutional bonds that are stronger and more affirmative than is the case with ours. If we have a characteristic, it is indeed the separation between the parties and the unions. Can one imagine, in France, more than one-third of the deputies of the left being sponsored and financed directly by the unions? This is the case in England, where the Labour Party and the trade unions spend their time exchanging their people, their money, their programs and their powers. Where the prime minister in office finds it natural to open a trade-union congress by addressing himself fraternally to his dear "comrades"? In the FRG with Helmut Schmidt, but not in France, where even G. Marchais falls silent when the CGT holds its congresses. Where enrollment in a trade union is automatically transformed into affiliation with the Socialist Party without the person involved having anything to say about it? This is the Swedish practice, whereas the French worker would be scandalized if his union dues were to go into the treasury of any party. Not to mention the Americans: whereas we cry scandal when the unions permit themselves to take a position on exclusively political problems, the AFL-CIO has been passing resolutions on the United States' foreign policy for a long time and even opens its billfold to support the actions it recommends. It is in the United States, and not in France, that one finds regular trade-union staff whose exclusive task is to see that wage-earners are registered as voters, etc.

It is pointless to go on with this list. It is likewise pointless to deny, for example, the bonds between the PCF and the CGT. It is only a matter of putting things in their proper place. Those who deplore trade-union politicization should in fact rejoice that among us, it is obliged to remain clandestine, unavowed, limited, and inversely, should fear lest, after the manner of other countries, it grow stronger and become more institutionalized.

The permanence of such a gap between the Epinal image and the reality calls for explanation. Of course, ignorance of foreign movements provides a good excuse. But another hypothesis is possible: the main fault ascribed to the French unions might be not that they are politicized but that they are politicized in a wrong direction, that they do not carry on "good" politics. Apoliticism, as is known, is one of the

favorite disguises of those who support the political tendency to power. Such behavior is not the appanage of the Western parties of the right only, as the recent example of Poland shows: the strikers have had a right to official recognition only to the extent to which they have promised not to get involved in politics--that is, not to challenge the policy of the Party.

As valid as it may be, this interpretation has the disadvantage of dispensing too easily with a more serious problem: that of the relations between parties and unions and, more generally, between the unions and politics? That the public at large might be making an error of fact about the peculiarities of the French unions is one thing, but that the relations between the unions and politics are not satisfactory is another.

Beyond the statements they make, the bosses of enterprise help by their daily practice to strengthen the politicization which they denounce in words. If all of the wage-earners complain about politicization, it is often out of a feeling of exasperation at seeing the systematic transfer of all the local problems to the central level. They would like these problems to be dealt with on the spot and to result in appropriate solutions rather than be drowned in national campaigns of uncertain outcome. The unions are not the only ones responsible for this transfer. A good part of it results from the employers' refusal to enter into negotiations permitting the least prospect of success. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, a kind of complicity has been established for a long time: "Let us settle matters between ourselves, at the price of a few concessions, in order to keep the state from getting involved." The French employers have preferred, for their part, to cede power to the state rather than concede a fragment of its power within its private domain, business enterprise.

What has happened since 1978 illustrates this strategy. Whereas just after the failure of the Left, under the impulse of a CFDT that was anxious to resyndicalize, the unions as a whole seemed ready to concentrate on the enterprises again, the employers' world did not know how or did not want to seize the opportunity. On the contrary, taking advantage of its indisputable position of strength, it has shown itself more reticent toward any serious negotiation and any power-sharing. The CGT, already sufficiently inclined toward seeing nothing but compromise in any search for negotiation, had a good time then in denouncing the ineffectiveness of the CFDT strategy. At the moment when no words were too strong for its denunciation of trade-union politicization, the employers adopted the strategy most likely to repoliticize the unions. The objective alliance between the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] and the CGT was manifested once again, with each comforting the other in its most traditional and, ultimately, most highly politicized positions.

Will it all remain fixed? Will the stereotypes continue to prevail? This would be to forget the third partner: the political parties. If, as we think, only a modification of the parties-unions relationship can be the source of true evolution, where does this relationship stand today?

#### The Failure of the Old Models

##### The Party-Dominance Model

The model of party-union relation with which we are most familiar is that of the relations between the PCF and the CGT. It amounts to reducing trade-unionism to a secondary role, to a minor status. As soon as one postulates that a preliminary re-

quirement for revolution is the taking of political power, it is clear that the party alone is qualified to play the role of guide. Without it, trade-unionism gets bogged down and is ultimately detoured into struggles that are strictly for demands and corporatist. Only integration of trade-union struggles in a movement led by the party will produce an opening in the long run. The long run is for the party, the short run is for the union. The party's task is overall strategy, the union's task is day-to-day concrete action. It is up to the union to stimulate awareness and mobilize the troops, and it is to the party to tell them where to go. When there could be a conflict between the political objectives and the trade-union objectives, the latter must yield. The strategy followed by the CGT for the last several months shows those who thought they diagnosed an evolution toward union autonomy that they were in error.

On this point, the PS [Socialist Party] is not so far-removed from the PCF as is believed. Not having had the means to have a union at its call, its position is more discreet. It nonetheless shares with the PCF the conviction of the preeminent role of the party, considering trade-unionism as an additive force. The sourness of the relations between the leaders of the PS and those of the CFDT shows the firmness of the party's attitude that trade-unionism is not on the same level with it. Thus it is coming to make the matter of the employers its own and to accuse the CFDT of politicization. According to Lionel Jospin, "the CFDT continues to be fascinated by politics, even when it says it is avoiding it. And therefore it continues to preach to us on the political plane." What insolence, the idea that the unions should stay in their place, in the enterprises, where only the party's cells are to have the right to be involved in politics. The PS probably also shares with the PCF the conviction that control of the state and of the national economy is the prior condition and the end result of all revolutionary action. It then runs up against a trade-unionism for which the changing of society cannot be reduced to modification of control at the level of the state; one does not want just to change masters when changing regime.

If, then, things are still the same with the PCF as well as the PS, what is new? Simply that these two variants of the same model run the same risk of failure: the wage-earners do not want any more of them. For years, the prospect of an election victory had made it possible to nourish the hope of an imminent political solution. The breakup of the union of the left made spectacular and sudden a trend that had begun a long time earlier and remained underground: scepticism about the virtues of the socialist society proclaimed. Had people really believed in the Common Program? In any case, people tried to convince themselves of its benefits. Even if one does not share all their views, sociologists of the left such as A. Touraine and A. Gorz said out loud what many were thinking to themselves: the political solutions written into the programs of the parties of the left are no longer credible for the majority of wage-earners--the "projects" proposed by the ones or the others do not represent a valid resolution of their day-to-day difficulties or a promising outlet for their fundamental aspirations.

#### The Model of Division of Labor

The functioning of this system rests on two conditions that are not met in France. On the one hand, it is necessary for the two partners to be nearly equal in strength. This is the case in Sweden and in the FRG: unions which are almost monopolies and encompass the vast majority of wage-earners combine with socialist parties that represent the essential part of the forces of the left; the relationship



between these two powers can remain sound and balanced. On the other hand, the political system has to enable the socialist party to exercise party or permit it the hope of achieving it. These two conditions are far from being fulfilled in the case of France. The reformist trade unions are weak, representing a minority of wage-earners and divided within themselves. How, then, could they exercise real influence on the political parties? Moreover, political power is held in a durable manner by a majority that is electorally more representative of the wealthy or well-off social strata than of the popular classes. Far from there being an implicit complicity between the trade-union ideology and the ideology of the majority, the opposite is the case. The only way for these unions to achieve a success from a position of weakness is to sell a few concessions in order to obtain the favors of the Prince; they will always find it very difficult to refute the other unions' accusations of compromise. The sociodemocratic model is perhaps to be envied; but for the time being, its establishment in France is in the realm of mythology and has no credibility.

In summary: for various reasons, the two models inherited from the past appear today to lack any future. In this vacuum, another model has arisen that has a better chance.

### The "Rival Partners"

Underlying this redefinition of the relations between parties and unions is the recognition of an objective fact: the inextricable overlapping of the political, the economic and the social, which makes it impossible to maintain the traditional frontiers between the roles of the parties and those of the unions. "The parties have been forced to cope with the political nature of social struggles, and the unions have been obliged to concern themselves with the same problems from another point of view.... The unions have had to come to terms with the government in dealing with economic policy as a whole, while the parties have been confronted with the problems of organization of labor, of cost, and of wage structure."\* It is the end of the private reserves, of the taboos. Jospin felt this distinctly when he warned the CFDT to "respect the taboo against incest" (meaning: not to touch its political big brother). The taboo has been violated for a long time.

This type of trade-unionism refuses to put any distance whatsoever between immediate or local demands and structural reforms of the whole of society. With its roots in the rank and file, and as the privileged bearer of the aspirations of its constituents, it knows that it has to emerge at the political level, but it does not want to allow to anyone else the task of defining the nature of these transformations and of determining whether they are consistent with the original desire. It does not presume to replace the party. It does not have a vocation to be the exclusive definer of political proposals. It is a full-fledged political actor, but only one actor among others.

Another thing that trade-unionism demands is autonomy of approach. A political party, obliged to represent a range of voters and invested with its own rationality, will be led to pursue strategies that do not always coincide with the union strategy. Trade-unionism, aware that it represents an autonomous political force, wants

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\* Dimitri Weiss, in "Politique, Partis et Syndicats dans l'Entreprise" [Politics, Parties and Unions in the Enterprises], publ Organisation, 1979.



to exercise this power in complete autonomy. It does not grant, for example, that it is obliged to renounce the making of one agreement or another with the employers or the government on the grounds--even if valid--that it delays the advent of the Great Day.

In this model, partnership and rivalry are indissociable. Partnership because the union, as a single political actor, cannot pretend to cover the whole political field. Partnership to the extent to which it would remain ineffective if the political parties did not take over in order to translate trade-union aims into terms of conduct. But also rivalry and competition: which of these two political actors will best express the needs of the individuals? Which will appear as the bearer of a credible and mobilizing plan? Which will be capable of finding the effective strategies for achieving tangible results? In a pluralist society, this competition is inevitable and indispensable. Instead of waxing indignant at the appearance of political cells in the enterprises, the champions of competitive liberalism would do better to see it as a sign of extension of competition. They should have rejoiced at the parties' needing more reliable links than the unions. At a time when the employer and union leaders are invading the political field, it is normal for the parties to penetrate into what was formerly the private domain of the same employers and trade-unionists.

Is it so certain that this is the model of the future? Theoretically yes, to the extent to which the other models are dying out, are falling farther and farther away from everyday reality. The model in question, though, rejects factitious alienations and simplistic schemes; it is trying to invent a mode of relationship that measures up to the degree of complexity of modern societies. But in practice? It is clear that the CFDT risks being a lone rider for a long time. It cannot count on the support of the CGT, except in a case--an improbable one--in which the aspirations to trade-union autonomy expressed at the Grenoble Congress were to gain the upper hand. Neither, despite some sympathies, could it count on the reformist unions: they are afraid that politicization means a loss of independence and prefer to run the risk of going toward a categorial and corporatist trade-unionism. And in particular, the CFDT cannot count on the parties, which are still attached to their traditional patterns. But if the parties do not in their turn take up sooner or later, entirely or in part, the themes initiated by the CFDT, what will happen? No matter what the strength of their conviction, the CFDT militants might well tire one day of always sowing without ever seeing the grain sprout: the risk here is of discouragement and scepticism. Inversely, in the state of political vacuum, they could be tempted to go farther than they want to, substituting themselves in fact for failing parties. The risk in this case is of total confusion of domains.

In brief, if the foundations of a possible partnership are not laid, there will no longer be anything but general and sterile rivalry.

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Editor's Note: To complete this series of articles, PROJET will publish, in its issue of next January, an analysis of reformist trade-unionism by J.D. Reynaud.

One may refer to "New Trade-Union Strategies," PROJET, No 129, November 1978, with articles by B. Brunhes, X. Greffe and P. Rosanvallon and the interview with L. Chavrot (CGT), A. Faesch (FO [Workers Force]) and A. Mercier (CFDT).

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## CANARY COMMUNIST PARTY'S AYALA ON AUTONOMY, MILITARY BASES

Caracas TRIBUNA POPULAR in Spanish 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 p 3

[Interview with Aurelio Ayala, Canarian Communist Party Central Committee member, by Luis Esteban Rojas; Caracas, Venezuela; date not given]

[Text] Comrade Aurelio Ayala, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Canary Islands [PCC], warned against the danger which the separation of the Canaries from the other peoples who make up the Spanish state could involve.

"Our party advocates for the Canary Islands the same autonomous regime as that enjoyed by Catalonia and the Basque country but taking into account the different peculiarities of the archilepago." This was affirmed by Comrade Aurelio Ayala, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Canary Islands, an organization affiliated with the Spanish Communist Party [PCE].

Aurelio Ayala is in Venezuela making contact with the Canarian colony living in this country and with Venezuelan leftist organizations. He was accompanied to our editorial office by comrades Marcelino Casanovas of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia [PSUC] representing the Catalanian communists, and by Marcelino Morales Quintero, an activist of the Communist Party of the Canary Islands.

According to Aurelio Ayala's account the Canarian communists are now engaged in a struggle on two fundamental fronts: First, in the middle of a profound recession and economic deterioration they are facing the problem represented by 78,000 unemployed workers.

The other front is that of the autonomy of the Canary Islands. Regarding the latter, our interviewee noted that "following the defeat of the government across the country in the past elections, there has been a restatement of the central committee's positions regarding all the nationalities and regions which form the Spanish state."

"The Spanish left, through popular mobilizations, has managed that there be brought into effect a plan at the state level, which we call a plan for the construction of the state of autonomies," Aurelio Ayala asserted.

He added that in fact two regions, Catalonia and the Basque country, enjoy such autonomous regime, having their own parliament and their own government. "For the Canaries we are advocating a similar autonomous regime but taking into account the different peculiarities of the Canarian archipelago among which the most important is that the Canarian National Statute and Canarian autonomy should be recognized."

The Canarian communists also call for the Canary Islands to be a zone of military neutrality and say that at no time should foreign military bases be established in these islands.

"What is the basis of this last provision?"

"We want to make a point of this because the United States seriously intends to set up American or NATO military bases in the Canary Islands. And it is precisely this imperialist intention which makes us fight to maintain unity with the other peoples of Spain because, in the last analysis, what is important for the workers is not the method of the state's organization but rather the building of socialism."

Regarding the relations of the Communist Party of the Canary Islands with the independence-oriented groups evolving in the archipelago, Aurelio Ayala explained that there is a difference of opinion in that these groups seek the separation of the Canary Islands from the rest of the Spanish people while, as noted earlier, the communists seek only Canarian autonomy, not separation from Spain.

"However, on the basis of the criterion that freedom is indivisible, the Spanish Communist Party has always defended the legalization of the independence-oriented groups and thanks to our political pressure it has achieved this goal, always noting that our political posture is that of supporting democracy in Spain and building a state of autonomous entities as the first step so that all we peoples who make up Spain should build the federal state to which we inspire," the Canarian communist leader explained.

#### Visit in Venezuela

Regarding his visit to our country and the fulfillment of the goals that the organization in which he is an activist has set for itself, Comrade Aurelio Ayala noted that he had already had a meeting on 24 October 1980 at the Canary Islands Club and that on Wednesday, 29 October 1980, another would take place at the Canarian-Venezuelan Center of Caracas.

It was brought out that the importance of his meetings with Canarians and Venezuelan political organizations was to publicize the position of the Canarian communists "and then clarify the Canarian reality known in Venezuela only through the independence-oriented groups."

"We believe it is fundamental that the Venezuelan left should know, from a Marxist viewpoint, what is happening in the islands, the reason why we advocate autonomy for the archipelago, and our struggle against imperialism, all of this presented by someone recently arrived from the Canaries where daily, on an individual basis, together with the Canarian workers, we strive to guide the Canaries along the path of socialism and not as has happened so far when reports about the Canary Islands emanated from abroad, thousands of kilometers away. For in the Canaries there is a people which has set out to move to consolidate democracy through autonomy and through socialism," the Canarian revolutionary asserted.



[Photo caption:] Aurelio Ayala (inset above and left in the above photograph) with his companions in the editorial office of TRIBUNA POPULAR.

2662

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## ECEVIT RESIGNS FROM RPP LEADERSHIP

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 31 Oct 80 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET BUREAU) -- RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit has announced his resignation from the RPP leadership.

In a statement on the matter, the National Security Council [NSC] Secretariat General said that Ecevit's announcement of his resignation was not appropriate from the standpoint of the calm which the country needs.

## NSC's Statement

The NSC Secretariat General's statement is as follows:

"The reply given by the NSC secretary general at a meeting on 28 October with representatives of the foreign press in answer to a question about the future political activities of the RPP and JP [Justice Party] leaders from the political parties whose activities were suspended was inaccurately reported under different and inaccurate headlines in certain press organs in such a way as to mislead the public. For this reason, it was deemed necessary by the Secretariat General to make an announcement about the true situation in a communique on 29 October. After dissemination of the communique, Bulent Ecevit attempted to inform the public by means of a prepared statement bearing the nature of a speech for political purposes of his resignation from the general chairmanship of the RPP.

"Since all political activities were halted by Communique No 1 on 12 September 1980, such a text, exceeding the purpose of giving notice of a personal decision to resign, might serve to revive all the controversy over Bulent Ecevit's statements and deeds in the flow of events leading to 12 September 1980, and for this reason, publication of this text is deemed inappropriate by the NSC."

## What Did Demirel Say?

Asked what he thought about "Ecevit's leaving the general chairmanship of the RPP," JP General Chairman Suleyman Demirel replied, "I have nothing to say. No comment. It is up to you to comment."

#### Ustundag Will Substitute

RPP General Secretary Ustundag visited Ecevit yesterday morning at his home in Oran and talked with him for some time.

General Secretary Mustafa Ustundag will assume the duties of general chairman upon Ecevit's resignation. The final paragraph of article 30 of the RPP bylaws says: "In the absence of the General Chairman, the General Secretary will assume his duties."

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## SALTİK ANNOUNCES TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2 Nov 80 p 9

[Press conference on 1 Nov 80 by General Haydar Saltik, NSC secretary general, to announce transition program and answer questions submitted in advance.]

[Text] Ankara, Special -- National Security Council [NSC] Secretary General Gen Haydar Saltik announced at a press conference yesterday the program for transition to the normal democratic order. He announced the major lines of the program as "ensuring the prior conditions to make possible formation of the constituent assembly; passage of the law on the establishment, duties and powers of the constituent assembly to be appended to the law on the constitutional order, actual formation and commencement of duties of the constituent assembly and the preparation, with priority, of the new constitution; presenting the text of the new constitution first to the public and obtaining its approval [by means of] a referendum law to be prepared; preparation of a new parties law and a new electoral law in accordance with the regulations of the new constitution agreed upon by the public and passage of them by the constituent assembly; resumption of party activities, allowing sufficient time for the formation and organization of new parties in accordance with the new constitution and political parties law; the formation of parliament by holding general elections in accordance with the new electoral law at the end of this reasonable period of time and commencement of parliament's duties; the complete return to normal democratic political life with the termination of the duties and existence of the constituent assembly and the NSC in accordance with the temporary provisions placed in the constitution." Saltik noted that it was "not possible to appoint a date and time for the stages specified in this program" and said, "Our country has not yet reached the stage of forming the constituent assembly under the present circumstances."

NSC Secretary General Gen Haydar Saltik was accompanied at the press conference, which was held in the budget commission auditorium of the National Assembly building, by Rear Adm Isik Biren, Brig Gen Sadi Erguvenc and Brig Gen Muzaffer Baskaynak. He said the following:

## Constitutional Order

"The purpose of our press conference today, in any case, is to present general information of an instructive nature on constitutional law and constitutions to the distinguished members of the press and, through them, to the public, not to attempt debate of the regulations placed into effect by the 12 September action, the constitutionality of whose legal powers of disposal does not permit debate by the Constitutional Court.

"The fundamental law of the land, as known by everyone who, though not a lawyer, has had the opportunity to be concerned with social matters, has been called the 'Anayasa [constitution]' in our country for more than 30 years, but formerly was referred to as the 'Kanun-i Esasi' and later as 'Teskilat-i Esasiye Kanunu' or 'Esas Teskilat Kanunu.' This is the law which regularizes the basic rights and obligations, on one hand, of the founding principles and bases of the state and its basic institutions and organs and, on the other, of the citizens, or in broader terms, the relationship of individuals to the state.

"The rationale and text of the Law on the Constitutional Order have revealed in a manner to leave no room for doubt or hesitation what kind of alterations were made in the rules of law which were in effect in Turkey on 11 September 1980. Nevertheless, there are certain matters on which doubt existed both before and after publication of the law published under the name of 'Law on the Constitutional Order.'

"Before announcing, in the capacity of secretary general of the NSC, the questions conveyed to us by the distinguished representatives of various press organs and agencies, I think it would be well to draw their attention once more to the general rationale of the law to which I referred. I would like to begin my remarks by reading verbatim this rationale to refresh everyone's memory:

"Seeing that a climate existed in which multipronged attacks against the existence and independence of the Republic of Turkey, which is an indivisible whole as a nation and a people, and against our democratic regime, to which our people are wholeheartedly committed and which is truly secular, in which separatist and subversive provocations and behavior, anarchistic actions and armed terrorism, which virtually eliminated the security of property and the right and freedom to live without fear which must be provided and preserved in a civilized society and in the life of every state, had spread to the limit, and

"Seeing that the Parliament, the basic institution of the regime, had been brought to a state in which it could not perform its duty and that the roads had been closed by which the democratic volition could operate normally,

"The Turkish Armed Forces, born of the bosom of the nation, being mindful of its historic responsibility, acted on behalf of the supreme Turkish nation and realized the 12 September 1980 operation by command and within the chain of order and command.

"The public was informed of the causes which rendered this action necessary and of the goals of the action by means of National Security Council Communique No 1 and, in a more general way, by the address of the council chairman broadcast on radio and television on 12 September,

"And was informed of the manner in which the National Security Council was formed by Communique No 4.

"As required by the action which the Turkish Armed Forces realized by order and within the chain of order and command, the National Security Council temporarily assumed legislative and executive powers and placed into effect in the form of communiques, decisions and laws by publication in the RESMI GAZETE the legal rules required by the circumstances.



"The program of the Council of Ministers, which was formed under Bulend Ulusu on 21 September and approved by the head of state, was discussed by the National Security Council and confidence in the government was expressed on 30 September.

"Thus the executive duty was released to the government within the framework of the Constitution and the law.

"The legal powers of disposal of the National Security Council in the aftermath of 12 September 1980 have not removed from effect the legal rules and regulations which were in effect in the Republic of Turkey on 11 September 1980, but certain regulations have been changed by communique, decision and law as stated above and certain regulations have been introduced. Thus the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey No 334, dated 9 July 1961, and its amendments remain in effect exclusive of certain amendments introduced by communiqués, decisions and laws adopted and published by the National Security Council as of 12 September 1980 as well as all laws not having regulations amended.

"The National Security Council, until a new Constitution is written, presented for the approval of and accepted by the nation, will perform the duties of the Parliament, never failing to be guided by the principles of Atatürk, in order that the purposes of the action revealed to Turkish and world public opinion in the press may be achieved as soon as possible and will exercise during this period in the manner dictated by the national needs and the national goals the powers of Parliament, including the power to amend the Constitution as stated in article 155 of the 1961 Constitution. It was deemed necessary that the appended law be written and placed into effect for the purpose of leaving no room for doubt as to the Constitution or the Interim Constitution or the legal order in general and for the purpose of meeting the needs, which have been or may be in the future specified, of the period which began on 12 September 1980."

"We see that certain questions have been asked expressing doubt, despite the provisions and rationale which law No 2324 contains, about its having the title 'Law on the Constitutional Order.'"

"The term 'interim constitution,' which was adopted on 12 June 1960 after the 27 May 1960 revolution and which appeared in the law promulgated as law No 1, in the expression 'interim law,' on 14 June 1960, was not used, but 'interim constitution' could have been used in the sense that it contains the basic rules for a period of transition.

"Law 2324 could have been given the title 'Interim Constitution' or 'Law on the Basic Legal Order.' The NSC preferred the term 'Law on the Constitutional Order.' Moreover, the basic legal arrangements of the period which began on 12 September began with Communique No 1 at the first hour of the first day of the action, and, with law No 2324, the rules of law which changed or did not change gained full clarity.

#### Same Questions Answered

"It was announced by the head of state at the 16 September 1980 press conference that a constituent assembly would be formed when the circumstances in which the country found itself in the period of transition which began on 12 September 1980

were right and it was pointed out that the new constitution, the new parties law and the new electoral law would be prepared by this assembly. The same questions and answers have been repeated subsequently on various occasions.

"After mentioning the duties and powers of the NSC, and the council chairman and head of state, the general rationale of law No 2324 uses the passage 'until a new constitution is written and presented for the approval of and accepted by the nation,' not 'will prepare a new constitution and present it for the approval of the nation.' Both the mode of this statement and statements made and repeated before leave no room for doubt about whether a constituent assembly will be formed. Our country has not yet come to the stage of forming a constituent assembly under the present circumstances; all other questions about the constituent assembly will be answered when a law has been promulgated on its establishment and its duties and powers. The constituent assembly following the 27 May 1960 revolution was arranged by laws 157 and 158, and the actual formation and commencement of business of this assembly was possible only after a period in excess of 7 months, as I said once before.

#### Council's Authority to Amend Constitution

"There are also some questions about whether the Law on the Constitutional Order would be subject to change in the future and what form this change would take.

"Just as the manner of formation of the NSC was announced in Communiqué No 4, published on the first day of the 12 September action, the powers of the NSC are pointed out in law No 2324 which went into effect as of 12 September. There is no question of a different procedure in the NSC powers of disposal in connection with legislation. Inherent in any legislative power which the NSC would exercise temporarily is the power to amend the constitution under article 155 of the 1961 Constitution. It has been emphasized that such amendments will be made by law and it has been announced that the power will be exercised 'in the manner dictated by the national needs and the nation goals.'

#### How Will It Be Prepared

"Some questions have been asked, no doubt for the enlightenment of the public, about how the new constitution will be prepared and the nature of the provisions it will contain.

"The reasons which made the 12 September action necessary and the goals of this action have been announced to Turkey and the world and these causes and goals were placed as well in the introductory portion and the rationale of law No 2324.

"The Turkish Armed Forces, mindful of their historic responsibility, acted on behalf of the Turkish people and seized all administration by order and within the chain of order and command. The purposes they will pursue to the end with an unshakeable will are these:

- "a. To protect the existence and independence of the Turkish state,
- "b. To protect the integrity of the nation and the people,
- "c. To ensure the unity and cohesion of all Turkish people,
- "d. To prevent subversive and separatist trends,
- "e. The sovereignty of the Atatürkist views in the governing of the country,
- "f. The restoration of the weakened, indeed lost, authority of the state.

"The constitutional measures to be taken in order to achieve these purposes will be publicly debated after the establishment of the constituent assembly.

"Various trends and preferences will be expressed during the preparation and discussion in the constituent assembly of the new constitution of the democratic legal state and will emerge during the submission to the public of the new constitution.

"Bearing in mind the negative developments in our political life up until 11 September 1980, our citizens and certain foreign circles are concerned as to what the political activities and party configurations and endeavors of the future will be.

"Doubtless, a variety of answers will be offered to such questions as these depending on the perspective from which the events prior to 12 September are viewed. The NSC does not want to set prior provisions on the matters which it is possible or likely will be contained in the new constitution to be taken up with priority after formation of the constituent assembly and in the parties and electoral laws to be prepared after the constitution has been submitted to the public and approved.

#### Interim Regulations

"A question asked on behalf of one of our newspapers had to do with what the post-12 September legal powers of disposal will be in the period following preparation of the new constitution and its submission to and approval by the public and whether conformity to the new constitution of the laws which have been passed may be contested.

"Certain transitional, or temporary, regulations must of necessity be contained in any new constitution. The matters which constitute the subject of this question are ones which will be dealt within the new constitution which the constituent assembly will prepare and submit to the public. Those not designated 'temporary' of the laws passed during the period which began on 12 September will express essentially continuous dominion. The laws or legal rules which the NSC promulgates in the capacity of the legislative body are not actually temporary but express legal rules promulgated in a period of transition. The legislative power which, in accordance with law No 2324, is to be exercised by the NSC until formation of the constituent assembly, will be exercised during the period after passage of the law pertaining to formation of the constituent assembly and the actual formation and commencement of duties of the constituent assembly within the framework of the provisions of that law.

"After public approval of the new constitution, the matter as to the principles on which legislative power will be exercised in the period between conclusion of the general elections which will be held in accordance with the new parties and electoral laws and the formation and commencement of duties of the Turkish Grand National Assembly will be set forth in temporary provisions of the new constitution, as we said a while ago.

## Program for Transition to Democracy

"I am announcing on this occasion the major lines of the program for transition to a normal democratic order. This program may be summarized as follows:

"a. To ensure the prior conditions to make possible formation of the constituent assembly,

"b. Passage of the 'Law on the Formation, Duties and Powers of the Constituent Assembly' to be issued as an annex to law No 2324,

"c. Actual establishment and commencement of duties of the constituent assembly, with priority on preparation of the new constitution,

"d. Submission of the text of the new constitution to the public and obtaining its approval by means of a referendum law to be prepared,

"e. Preparation and passage by the constituent assembly of a new parties law and a new electoral law in accordance with the regulations approved by the public of the new constitution,

"f. Commencement of party activities after allowing sufficient time for the formation and organization of new parties according to the new constitution and political parties law,

"g. The formation and commencement of duties of parliament by holding general elections in accordance with the new electoral law, at the conclusion of the reasonable period of time I mentioned,

"h. The complete return to normal democratic political life by termination of the duties and existence of the constituent assembly and the NSC in accordance with temporary provisions to be placed in the constitution.

"That it is impossible to assign dates and times to the stages designated in the program will no doubt be appreciated by everyone of good will.

## Nature of NSC

"One of the questions conveyed to us prior to this meeting has to do with whether the NSC may be said to have introduced a presidential system in the exercise of its legislative power in accordance with the provisions of law no 2324 and whether the legislative endeavors of the NSC are like parliamentary endeavors. As the public knows, the NSC was formed as a natural consequence of the complete seizure of administration by order within the chain of order and command by the Turkish Armed Forces, acting in consonance with its historic responsibility on behalf of the Turkish nation, and the manner of its formation was announced in Communique No 4 on the first day of the operation. The NSC's requisite exercise of its legislative power has nothing to do with accepting it as a parliament. The NSC has no parties, party groups or party-affiliated members. Just as it could not be thought from this standpoint that a presidential system has been adopted in the basic legal order through the organization of the NSC and the exercise of its legislative powers, it is impossible for the legislative endeavors of the NSC to be



like those in parliament. The NSC is the responsible body of the 12 September action and its endeavors will take place in keeping with its own structure and the nature of its duties and responsibilities.

#### Powers of Constitutional Court

"Some questions asked for clarification of the present duties and powers of the Constitutional Court and the Council of State.

"The Constitutional Court and the Council of State were set up by the 1961 Constitution and their own formation and laws. As will be seen in the rationale and text of law No 2324, which is effective as of 12 September 1980, all laws not amended or rescinded are in effect. From this standpoint, there is no room for doubt as to the duties and powers of the Constitutional Court and the Council of State.

"It is natural that the NSC should fill a few vacancies on the Constitutional Court for which selections have not yet been made.

"Some representatives of the press also expressed a desire to learn whose expertise is relied upon in the NSC Secretariat General and who contributes to its endeavors.

"It is natural that in the committees conducting studies or preparing legislation, those sons of the country would be relied upon whose commitment to the principles of Ataturk, knowledge and persons are trusted. We believe it has become necessary to look at the solution of national questions, not from the individual standpoint or the perspective of personalities, but from the perspective of the possibilities for achieving our national goals quickly.

#### Contribution of the Press

"Another topic which it was desired be aired at this press conference has to do with the kind of evaluation of the 12 September action we are generating in the understanding and behavior of the foreign press and certain foreign circles and organizations.

"It was pointed out once more in the rationale of law 2324 the climate and circumstances under which the 12 September action was realized. The doubts generated in certain foreign circles by the failure to appreciate adequately the conditions in our country, we firmly believe, will be removed when it is seen that the action is moving forward, unswerving and unshakeable, toward its original goal.

"Those who see and understand the work being done for the restoration as soon as possible of the free, democratic order, which our people call their own and will never relinquish, will appreciate the 12 September action sooner or later, if they bear no grudge against the Turkish nation or the free democratic order.

"The NSC's efforts to restore as soon as possible the destroyed authority of the state cannot be interpreted in the sense of restricting the freedoms.

"The purposes of 12 September are clear and they will be achieved. The action is advancing toward its goals with positive developments. We have no illusions about the time required to achieve these purposes. The time needed to achieve the purposes of the 12 September action, which has the very extensive support of our people, will be abbreviated to the extent of the effort and contribution of our press, which performs the task of forming public opinion."

General Saltik noted that "questions concerning the executive should be directed to the government" and said that "other questions would be answered at another press conference in the future." He said "Goodbye" before the members of the press could ask any questions, and thus the press conference ended.

8349

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## PERSONAL PROPERTY STATEMENTS TO BE REQUIRED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 1 Nov 80 pp 1,11

[Article by Saygi Ozturk]

[Text] Ankara (HURRIYET) -- The draft has been prepared for amendment of the law pertaining to the prevention, pursuit and verification of smuggling. After the law goes into effect, personal property statements will be required for all state employees and workers, their wives and children, dependents and persons living with them. These persons will be required to reveal the sources from which they obtained property acquired since beginning their jobs and to prove their right of possession. Property determined to have been unrightfully acquired will be confiscated immediately and the jobs of those in this position will be terminated. Besides public sector employees, property statements will be requested from smuggling suspects and their accomplices and their wives and children. Those having been convicted of smuggling, meanwhile, even if granted amnesty, may no longer hold public employment.

The amendment draft of Smuggling Law No 1918 was prepared by the Interior Ministry in consultation with various ministries. The draft, which is to be forwarded to the Prime Ministry Council for Legal Planning, covers public employees.

The following provision is introduced for public employees in the draft to amend the law on the prevention, pursuit and verification of smuggling No 1918:

"Civil servants and employees of the state, local administrations, municipalities and their agencies, ward and village head men, rural and forest rangers, village guards, staff and workers of public economic enterprises and executive board employees, as specified in law No 1918, article 2, paragraph 1, are required to file a report of all possessions for themselves and their wives and children, dependents and anyone living with them when entering on duty and to report within 1 month any changes in possessions, to reveal the sources from which they obtained properties acquired after entering on duty and to prove right of ownership.

"Those employees listed above who fail to perform this duty or who fail to file upon being requested to do so or who fail to present just cause of ownership or who file false reports will be subject to imprisonment of from 3 months to 1 year and temporary deprivation of public service. Decision is further given on the confiscation of property not demonstrated to be acquired justly by the suspect."

## Smuggling Suspects

The courts will be able to subpoena reports by those who have been arrested on smuggling charges and their accomplices on the sources of all possessions of both themselves and their wives and children.

Smuggling suspects and their accomplices will be under obligation to file a report and to prove their rightful ownership of the possessions named. Real property acquired unrightfully by the suspect and his accomplices will be confiscated. The penalty for filing a false report will be imprisonment of from 6 months to 2 years for the suspect and his accomplices. In the event of falsification of the report given by the suspect to corroborate information shown in his deposition, the provisions of the Turkish Penal Code will apply.

If it is determined that smuggling suspects hide or smuggle property to which rightful acquisition is not established, a penalty of from 1 to 5 years' imprisonment will apply.

## No Civil Service

According to the draft, those convicted and imprisoned on smuggling charges, even if they have been granted amnesty, will not be allowed to work for the state, public enterprises, special administrations and municipalities.

Those convicted or suspected of smuggling will be denied passports to leave the country.

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